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Appendix A References for Major Model Assumptions
Model Reference
Consumer utility model Chen et al. [8], Desai and Purohit [10], Desai and Purohit [11],
(Willingness-to-pay model) Huang et al. [20], Iyer [21], Purohit [27]
GNB scheme for the negotiated Chen et al. [8], Desai and Purohit [11]
retail price
Model Parameter Reference
Average valuation of consumers, As reported by Edmunds.com [13], the average retail price of a car
E() = $29; 916:6 or truck in the U.S. in 2009 was $28; 492, we can reasonably assume the
average valuation E() of consumers is the average retail price $28; 492
plus the sales tax 5% $28; 492 = $1; 424:6. That is, E() = $29; 916:6.
Standard deviation of consumers Using the data of individual consumer purchases of three popular
valuations  = $4; 000 automobiles in the U.S., Chen et al. [8] found that the standard
deviations of consumersvaluations for three popular automobiles
are between $2; 100 and $6; 600. Thus,  = $4; 000.
Retailers bargaining power Using the data of individual consumer purchases of three popular
 = 0:4 automobiles in the U.S., Chen et al. [8] estimated that the
bargaining powers of dealers for three automobiles are between
0.384 and 0.453. Since the retailer may have a lower bargaining
power during the economic recession because of the pressure
of disposing excess inventory, we assume that  = 0:4.
Wholesale price w = $27; 000 Edmunds.com [13] reported that the average retail price of a
car or truck in the U.S. in 2009 was $28; 492. Albuquerque and
Bronnenberg [1] found that retailersaverage gross margin
is approximately $1; 600. Thus, we assume that w = $27; 000.
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Appendix B Data and Sensitivity Analysis Results
Table A: Panel A indicates the 2009 federal tax rate schedule for qualifying single and joint lers
under the U.S. automobile tax reduction policy. Panel B presents the percentage distribution of
U.S. single lerstaxable incomes and that of joint lerstaxable incomes in 2009. Let I denote
the taxable income.
Panel A
2009 Taxable Income Bracket ($)
Estimated Federal Tax Rate Single Filers Joint Filers
10% 0  I < 8; 350 0  I < 16; 700
15% 8; 350  I < 33; 950 16; 700  I < 67; 900
25% 33; 950  I < 82; 250 67; 900  I < 137; 050
28% 82; 250  I  135; 000 137; 050  I < 208; 850
33%   208; 850  I  260; 000
Panel B
2009 Taxable Income Distribution
Income Range Single Filers Joint Filers
b0 = 0  I  b1 = $10; 000 PercS1 = 27:76% PercJ1 = 17:77%
b1 < I  b2 = $25; 000 PercS2 = 20:15% PercJ2 = 0:69%
b2 < I  b3 = $40; 000 PercS3 = 19:50% PercJ3 = 5:65%
b3 < I  b4 = $75; 000 PercS4 = 23:35% PercJ4 = 24:51%
b4 < I  b5 = $100; 000 PercS5 = 4:78% PercJ5 = 18:36%
b5 < I  b6 = $200; 000 PercS6 = 3:59% PercJ6 = 25:38%
b6 < I  b7 = $500; 000 PercS7 = 0:70% PercJ7 = 6:25%
b7 < I  b8 = $1; 000; 000 PercS8 = 0:11% PercJ8 = 0:95%
b8 < I < b9 =1 PercS9 = 0:07% PercJ9 = 0:44%
Percentage of Total Filers 57:57% 42:23%
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Table B: The correlation coe¢ cient r between the sales and the prot of the U.S. and the Chinese
automobile manufacturers. Note that the empirical data for the two U.S. manufacturers are ob-
tained from the rmsannual reports, and those for the two Chinese manufacturers are retrieved
online from http://stockdata.stock.hexun.com.
The U .S. Automobile Manufacturers The Chinese Automobile Manufacturers
GM Daim lerChrysler Shanghai Auto Co. Dongfeng Auto Co.
Year
Sales
(  103)
Prot
(  106 in U .S .$)
Sales
(  103)
Prot
(  106 in e)
Sales
(  103)
Prot
(  106 in U)
Sales
(  103)
Prot
(  106 in U)
2001 8,037 445 2,756 22,338 320 965 28 -20
2002 8,411 1,988 2,823 25,225 577 1,149 64 -70
2003 8,098 553 2,638 23,460 797 1,649 66 186
2004 8,984 11,226 2,780 24,362 848 1,923 61 1,123
2005 9,179 1,341 2,813 17,127 1,056 1,179 107 1,315
2006 9,093 7,328 2,655 18,901 1,344 5,636 126 1,146
2007 9,370 12,576 2,100 22,520 1,691 14,555 150 1,410
2008 8,362 -1 ,525 2,100 20,109 1,826 12,170 171 1,523
2009 7,477 -8 ,079 1,600 12,660   208 1,724
r 0.85 0.62 0.89 0.85
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Table C: Normal Distribution for ConsumersValuations: In Panel A, we calculate the expected
sales of each type of automobile (DH and DL), the retailers and the manufacturers expected
prots (R and M ), the system-wide prot (), and the prot-cost ratio () for the U.S. and the
Chinese policies in the current U.S. setting. In Panel B, we provide the results for the sensitivity
analysis on the cuto¤ level A (for the U.S. policy only). Note that A > wH . In Panel C, we provide
the results for the sensitivity analysis on the tax reduction percentage  (for the Chinese policy
only).
Panel A
Policy
Sales of Type-H
Automobile
Sales of Type-L
Automobile
Retailers Prot
(107)
Manufacturers
Prot (107)
System-wide
Prot (107)
Prot-Cost
Ratio
U.S. 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
Chinese 1970.92 4206.96 0.6548 2.0012 2.6560 1.0552
Panel B
Impact of the U.S. Policy
A DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
34500 1982.59 4198.03 0.6539 2.0029 2.6568 1.0478
37000 1982.59 4198.03 0.6555 2.0029 2.6584 1.0480
39500 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
42000 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
44500 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
47000 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
49500 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
52000 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
54500 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
57000 1982.59 4198.03 0.6559 2.0029 2.6588 1.0504
Panel C
Impact of the Chinese Policy
 D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
10% 1930.13 4136.68 0.6315 1.9648 2.5963 1.0802
18% 1967.92 4201.77 0.6531 1.9985 2.6516 1.0570
18.64% 1970.92 4206.96 0.6548 2.0012 2.6560 1.0552
25% 2000.57 4258.39 0.6724 2.0277 2.7001 1.0375
26% 2005.20 4266.46 0.6752 2.0319 2.7071 1.0348
34% 2041.93 4330.72 0.6978 2.0649 2.7627 1.0135
42% 2078.08 4394.51 0.7209 2.0976 2.8185 0.9932
50% 2113.62 4457.81 0.7444 2.1300 2.8744 0.9738
58% 2148.51 4520.58 0.7685 2.1619 2.9304 0.9552
66% 2182.73 4582.79 0.7931 2.1934 2.9865 0.9373
74% 2216.25 4644.41 0.8183 2.2244 3.0427 0.9203
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For the U.S. policy, the results in Panel B of Table C indicate that, when the cuto¤ level A is
su¢ ciently large and falls in the range [34; 500; 57; 000], an increase in A will have little impact on
the expected sales of the Type-H and Type-L automobiles, the expected prots of the retailer, the
manufacturer, and the supply chain, as well as the cost e¤ectiveness of the policy.
For the Chinese policy, we plot the results in Panel C of Table C to illustrate the impact of the
tax reduction percentage .
Chinese Policy: The impact of the tax reduction percentage  on: (a) the expected sales D^H and
D^L, (b) the retailers expected prot ^R, the manufacturers expected prot ^M , and the
system-wide expected prot ^, and (c) the prot-cost ratio ^.
v
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Table D: Normal Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the sales tax
rate t. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the value (which is given
outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
t DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
1% 2258.07 (0.765%) 4716.85 (0.568%) 0.8497 (1.467%) 2.2618 (0.642%) 3.1115 (0.866%) 0.9088
2% 2193.11 (1.668%) 4590.67 (1.201%) 0.7981 (3.032%) 2.1996 (1.375%) 2.9978 (1.811%) 0.9421
3% 2125.40 (2.721%) 4461.96 (1.903%) 0.7487 (4.702%) 2.1356 (2.207%) 2.8843 (2.843%) 0.9769
4% 2055.14 (3.937%) 4330.98 (2.679%) 0.7013 (6.484%) 2.0700 (3.144%) 2.7712 (3.969%) 1.0131
5% 1982.59 (5.332%) 4198.03 (3.532%) 0.6559 (8.384%) 2.0029 (4.193%) 2.6588 (5.196%) 1.0504
6% 1907.99 (6.920%) 4063.43 (4.467%) 0.6126 (10.409%) 1.9345 (5.361%) 2.5471 (6.532%) 1.0889
7% 1831.65 (8.718%) 3927.48 (5.487%) 0.5713 (12.569%) 1.8651 (6.655%) 2.4364 (7.985%) 1.1283
8% 1753.89 (10.746%) 3790.51 (6.599%) 0.5320 (14.870%) 1.7949 (8.082%) 2.3268 (9.562%) 1.1684
9% 1675.04 (13.022%) 3652.87 (7.807%) 0.4946 (17.321%) 1.7240 (9.651%) 2.2186 (11.272%) 1.2090
10% 1595.44 (15.568%) 3514.89 (9.117%) 0.4591 (19.930%) 1.6528 (11.368%) 2.1119 (13.124%) 1.2498
Impact of the Chinese Policy
t D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
1% 2256.04 (0.675%) 4718.50 (0.603%) 0.8495 (1.439%) 2.2616 (0.630%) 3.1111 (0.850%) 0.9105
2% 2188.88 (1.472%) 4594.05 (1.276%) 0.7977 (2.973%) 2.1990 (1.349%) 2.9967 (1.776%) 0.9443
3% 2118.82 (2.403%) 4467.14 (2.022%) 0.7480 (4.608%) 2.1347 (2.163%) 2.8827 (2.787%) 0.9798
4% 2046.08 (3.479%) 4338.01 (2.846%) 0.7004 (6.350%) 2.0687 (3.080%) 2.7691 (3.888%) 1.0168
5% 1970.92 (4.712%) 4206.96 (3.752%) 0.6548 (8.206%) 2.0012 (4.105%) 2.6560 (5.087%) 1.0552
6% 1893.63 (6.115%) 4074.25 (4.745%) 0.6113 (10.182%) 1.9324 (5.244%) 2.5437 (6.390%) 1.0948
7% 1814.53 (7.702%) 3940.20 (5.829%) 0.5699 (12.287%) 1.8625 (6.506%) 2.4324 (7.806%) 1.1356
8% 1733.97 (9.488%) 3805.10 (7.010%) 0.5304 (14.528%) 1.7918 (7.896%) 2.3221 (9.342%) 1.1774
9% 1652.30 (11.487%) 3669.28 (8.292%) 0.4929 (16.911%) 1.7204 (9.421%) 2.2133 (11.005%) 1.2200
10% 1569.90 (13.719%) 3533.06 (9.681%) 0.4573 (19.446%) 1.6486 (11.090%) 2.1059 (12.803%) 1.2631
The impact of the sales tax rate t on: (a) the percentage change in DH , (b) the percentage
change in DL, (c) the percentage change in , and (d) the prot-cost ratio .
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Table E: Normal Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the market
share of the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the
value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
Market Share
of Type-L Auto
DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
10% 5913.92 (4.733%) 599.72 (3.532%) 0.7198 (9.568%) 2.3976 (4.642%) 3.1174 (5.739%) 1.0915
20% 5258.70 (4.770%) 1199.44 (3.532%) 0.7091 (9.384%) 2.3318 (4.577%) 3.0410 (5.660%) 1.0858
30% 4603.48 (4.818%) 1799.16 (3.532%) 0.6985 (9.195%) 2.2661 (4.509%) 2.9645 (5.576%) 1.0797
40% 3948.25 (4.882%) 2398.88 (3.532%) 0.6878 (9.000%) 2.2003 (4.437%) 2.8881 (5.489%) 1.0732
50% 3293.03 (4.972%) 2998.60 (3.532%) 0.6772 (8.800%) 2.1345 (4.360%) 2.8117 (5.396%) 1.0662
60% 2637.81 (5.107%) 3598.31 (3.532%) 0.6665 (8.595%) 2.0687 (4.279%) 2.7352 (5.299%) 1.0586
70% 1982.59 (5.332%) 4198.03 (3.532%) 0.6559 (8.383%) 2.0029 (4.193%) 2.6589 (5.196%) 1.0504
80% 1327.36 (5.781%) 4797.75 (3.532%) 0.6453 (8.166%) 1.9371 (4.101%) 2.5824 (5.088%) 1.0416
90% 672.14 (7.219%) 5397.47 (3.532%) 0.6346 (7.942%) 1.8713 (4.002%) 2.5059 (4.973%) 1.0320
Impact of the Chinese Policy
Market Share
of Type-L Auto
D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
10% 5912.77 (4.712%) 600.99 (3.752%) 0.7194 (9.513%) 2.3976 (4.639%) 3.1170 (5.725%) 1.0998
20% 5255.80 (4.712%) 1201.99 (3.752%) 0.7086 (9.310%) 2.3315 (4.563%) 3.0401 (5.632%) 1.0936
30% 4598.82 (4.712%) 1802.98 (3.752%) 0.6979 (9.100%) 2.2655 (4.481%) 2.9633 (5.534%) 1.0871
40% 3941.85 (4.712%) 2403.97 (3.752%) 0.6871 (8.886%) 2.1994 (4.395%) 2.8865 (5.430%) 1.0800
50% 3284.87 (4.712%) 3004.97 (3.752%) 0.6763 (8.666%) 2.1333 (4.304%) 2.8097 (5.322%) 1.0724
60% 2627.90 (4.712%) 3605.96 (3.752%) 0.6656 (8.439%) 2.0673 (4.208%) 2.7328 (5.207%) 1.0641
70% 1970.92 (4.712%) 4206.96 (3.752%) 0.6548 (8.206%) 2.0012 (4.105%) 2.6560 (5.087%) 1.0552
80% 1313.95 (4.712%) 4807.95 (3.752%) 0.6441 (7.966%) 1.9351 (3.995%) 2.5792 (4.959%) 1.0454
90% 656.97 (4.712%) 5408.94 (3.752%) 0.6333 (7.719%) 1.8690 (3.878%) 2.5024 (4.818%) 1.0347
The impact of the market share of the Type-L automobile on: (a) the percentage change in ,
and (b) the prot-cost ratio .
Note that the e¤ectiveness of the U.S. policy in improving the sales DH depends on the market
share of the Type-L automobile, which, however, does not a¤ect its e¤ectiveness in improving DL.
This occurs because we have xed the income tax rate distribution of consumers in the Type-L
automobile market segment so that the income tax rate distribution of consumers in the Type-
H automobile market segment varies with the market share. Therefore, if the income tax rate
distribution of consumers of an automobile type is independent of the market share, then the
e¤ectiveness of the U.S. policy in improving the sales of this automobile does not vary with the
market share. Moreover, the e¤ectiveness of the Chinese policy in improving the sales of each
automobile type is independent of the market share of the Type-L automobile.
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Table F: Normal Distribution for Consumers Valuations: A sensitivity analysis on the means
E(H) and E(L) of the consumersnormally-distributed valuations H on the Type-H automobile
and L on the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in
the value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
Case E(H) E(L) DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
1 35,000 24,000 1398.39 (8.266%) 2816.41 (5.301%) 0.3560 (10.452%) 1.3693 (6.417%) 1.7253 (7.226%) 1.5262
2 35,500 24,500 1547.80 (7.473%) 3159.29 (4.828%) 0.4203 (9.898%) 1.5282 (5.817%) 1.9485 (6.672%) 1.3891
3 36,000 25,000 1696.47 (6.718%) 3507.45 (4.375%) 0.4917 (9.369%) 1.6884 (5.246%) 2.1801 (6.148%) 1.2648
4 36,500 25,500 1842.12 (6.004%) 3855.49 (3.943%) 0.5703 (8.864%) 1.8474 (4.704%) 2.4177 (5.656%) 1.1522
5 37,000 26,000 1982.59 (5.332%) 4198.03 (3.532%) 0.6559 (8.384%) 2.0029 (4.193%) 2.6588 (5.196%) 1.0504
6 37,500 26,500 2115.97 (4.702%) 4529.94 (3.144%) 0.7484 (7.928%) 2.1525 (3.713%) 2.9008 (4.769%) 0.9588
7 38,000 27,000 2240.66 (4.117%) 4846.57 (2.779%) 0.8474 (7.497%) 2.2942 (3.265%) 3.1416 (4.373%) 0.8764
8 38,500 27,500 2355.43 (3.576%) 5143.95 (2.439%) 0.9526 (7.090%) 2.4265 (2.850%) 3.3790 (4.011%) 0.8028
9 39,000 28,000 2459.43 (3.080%) 5418.93 (2.123%) 1.0634 (6.707%) 2.5480 (2.468%) 3.6114 (3.680%) 0.7373
10 39,500 28,500 2552.20 (2.629%) 5669.25 (1.833%) 1.1795 (6.348%) 2.6579 (2.118%) 3.8374 (3.382%) 0.6794
Impact of the Chinese Policy
Case E(H) E(L) D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
1 35,000 24,000 1385.54 (7.272%) 2825.09 (5.626%) 0.3551 (10.191%) 1.3671 (6.245%) 1.7222 (7.036%) 1.5345
2 35,500 24,500 1534.97 (6.581%) 3168.24 (5.125%) 0.4194 (9.661%) 1.5261 (5.670%) 1.9454 (6.505%) 1.3962
3 36,000 25,000 1683.85 (5.924%) 3516.53 (4.645%) 0.4907 (9.153%) 1.6864 (5.120%) 2.1771 (6.003%) 1.2709
4 36,500 25,500 1829.89 (5.300%) 3864.56 (4.187%) 0.5692 (8.668%) 1.8456 (4.598%) 2.4148 (5.530%) 1.1575
5 37,000 26,000 1970.92 (4.712%) 4206.96 (3.752%) 0.6548 (8.206%) 2.0012 (4.105%) 2.6560 (5.087%) 1.0552
6 37,500 26,500 2105.02 (4.161%) 4538.58 (3.341%) 0.7473 (7.766%) 2.1510 (3.640%) 2.8982 (4.673%) 0.9630
7 38,000 27,000 2230.54 (3.647%) 4854.81 (2.954%) 0.8462 (7.350%) 2.2929 (3.206%) 3.1391 (4.291%) 0.8802
8 38,500 27,500 2346.22 (3.171%) 5151.68 (2.593%) 0.9514 (6.956%) 2.4253 (2.802%) 3.3767 (3.939%) 0.8062
9 39,000 28,000 2451.18 (2.734%) 5426.06 (2.258%) 1.0622 (6.585%) 2.5470 (2.429%) 3.6092 (3.618%) 0.7404
10 39,500 28,500 2544.94 (2.336%) 5675.74 (1.950%) 1.1783 (6.236%) 2.6571 (2.088%) 3.8353 (3.328%) 0.6822
The impact of the mean of consumersvaluations on: (a) the percentage change in DH , (b) the
percentage change in DL, (c) the percentage change in , and (d) the prot-cost ratio .
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Table G: Normal Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the standard
deviation  of the consumersnormally-distributed valuations H on the Type-H automobile and
L on the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the
value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
 DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
2000 2389.12 (7.306%) 4852.42 (5.764%) 0.4467 (14.459%) 2.3516 (6.346%) 2.7983 (7.563%) 1.5187
2500 2239.33 (6.869%) 4598.44 (5.020%) 0.4961 (12.210%) 2.2193 (5.712%) 2.7154 (6.843%) 1.3706
3000 2129.54 (6.326%) 4423.00 (4.416%) 0.5480 (10.576%) 2.1255 (5.125%) 2.6735 (6.198%) 1.2415
3500 2046.78 (5.803%) 4295.14 (3.928%) 0.6015 (9.343%) 2.0561 (4.620%) 2.6576 (5.653%) 1.1359
4000 1982.59 (5.332%) 4198.03 (3.532%) 0.6559 (8.384%) 2.0029 (4.193%) 2.6588 (5.196%) 1.0504
4500 1931.53 (4.918%) 4121.88 (3.205%) 0.7110 (7.617%) 1.9609 (3.831%) 2.6719 (4.812%) 0.9808
5000 1890.05 (4.555%) 4060.59 (2.932%) 0.7665 (6.990%) 1.9269 (3.523%) 2.6935 (4.487%) 0.9234
5500 1855.72 (4.238%) 4010.24 (2.701%) 0.8223 (6.463%) 1.8990 (3.259%) 2.7213 (4.207%) 0.8750
6000 1826.87 (3.959%) 3968.15 (2.503%) 0.8780 (5.998%) 1.8755 (3.030%) 2.7535 (3.958%) 0.8325
6500 1802.30 (3.713%) 3932.44 (2.332%) 0.9329 (5.555%) 1.8556 (2.830%) 2.7885 (3.726%) 0.7917
Impact of the Chinese Policy
 D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
2000 2371.74 (6.525%) 4869.33 (6.133%) 0.4452 (14.096%) 2.3502 (6.281%) 2.7955 (7.453%) 1.5516
2500 2223.31 (6.104%) 4612.32 (5.338%) 0.4948 (11.916%) 2.2174 (5.625%) 2.7122 (6.719%) 1.3900
3000 2115.13 (5.606%) 4434.73 (4.693%) 0.5468 (10.332%) 2.1236 (5.032%) 2.6704 (6.076%) 1.2533
3500 2033.84 (5.134%) 4305.28 (4.174%) 0.6003 (9.137%) 2.0543 (4.528%) 2.6546 (5.536%) 1.1434
4000 1970.92 (4.712%) 4206.96 (3.752%) 0.6548 (8.206%) 2.0012 (4.105%) 2.6560 (5.087%) 1.0552
4500 1920.95 (4.343%) 4129.84 (3.405%) 0.7100 (7.461%) 1.9593 (3.748%) 2.6693 (4.710%) 0.9838
5000 1880.38 (4.021%) 4067.78 (3.114%) 0.7656 (6.853%) 1.9255 (3.444%) 2.6910 (4.392%) 0.9253
5500 1846.84 (3.739%) 4016.78 (2.869%) 0.8214 (6.347%) 1.8976 (3.185%) 2.7190 (4.120%) 0.8768
6000 1818.66 (3.492%) 3974.15 (2.658%) 0.8774 (5.921%) 1.8742 (2.960%) 2.7516 (3.886%) 0.8360
6500 1794.67 (3.274%) 3937.99 (2.476%) 0.9330 (5.559%) 1.8544 (2.764%) 2.7874 (3.683%) 0.8015
The impact of the stardard deviation of consumersvaluations on: (a) the percentage change in
DH , (b) the percentage change in DL, (c) the percentage change in , and (d) the prot-cost
ratio .
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Table H: Gamma Distribution for ConsumersValuations: In Panel A, we calculate the expected
sales of each type of automobile (DH and DL), the retailers and the manufacturers expected
prots (R and M ), the system-wide prot (), and the prot-cost ratio () for the U.S. and the
Chinese policies in the current U.S. setting. In Panel B, we provide the results for the sensitivity
analysis on the cuto¤ level A (for the U.S. policy only). Note that A > wH . In Panel C, we provide
the results for the sensitivity analysis on the tax reduction percentage  (for the Chinese policy
only).
Panel A
Policy
Sales of Type-H
Automobile
Sales of Type-L
Automobile
Retailers Prot
(107)
Manufacturers
Prot (107)
System-wide
Prot (107)
Prot-Cost
Ratio
U.S. 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
Chinese 1864.37 4294.04 0.6641 1.9874 2.6515 1.0911
Panel B
Impact of the U.S. Policy
A DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
34500 1875.62 4284.32 0.6630 1.9887 2.6517 1.0806
37000 1875.62 4284.32 0.6645 1.9887 2.6532 1.0826
39500 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0840
42000 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
44500 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
47000 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
49500 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
52000 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
54500 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
57000 1875.62 4284.32 0.6650 1.9887 2.6537 1.0843
Panel C
Impact of the Chinese Policy
 D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
10% 1825.45 4217.28 0.6410 1.9497 2.5907 1.1166
18% 1861.50 4288.37 0.6624 1.9846 2.6470 1.0930
18.64% 1864.37 4294.04 0.6641 1.9874 2.6515 1.0911
25% 1892.83 4350.28 0.6816 2.0149 2.6965 1.0731
26% 1897.29 4359.10 0.6844 2.0192 2.7036 1.0704
34% 1932.79 4429.43 0.7069 2.0536 2.7605 1.0487
42% 1967.97 4499.31 0.7298 2.0878 2.8176 1.0278
50% 2002.80 4568.69 0.7532 2.1217 2.8749 1.0079
58% 2037.24 4637.53 0.7773 2.1552 2.9325 0.9887
66% 2071.26 4705.77 0.8018 2.1885 2.9903 0.9703
74% 2104.83 4773.38 0.8269 2.2213 3.0482 0.9527
x
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Table I: Gamma Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the sales tax
rate t. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the value (which is given
outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
t DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
1% 2147.08 (0.816%) 4852.87 (0.606%) 0.8582 (1.443%) 2.2610 (0.680%) 3.1192 (0.889%) 0.9506
2% 2081.64 (1.753%) 4714.42 (1.284%) 0.8067 (2.978%) 2.1949 (1.450%) 3.0017 (1.856%) 0.9834
3% 2014.42 (2.818%) 4573.23 (2.038%) 0.7574 (4.607%) 2.1274 (2.314%) 2.8847 (2.906%) 1.0165
4% 1945.67 (4.020%) 4429.73 (2.871%) 0.7101 (6.334%) 2.0585 (3.276%) 2.7687 (4.043%) 1.0501
5% 1875.62 (5.367%) 4284.32 (3.787%) 0.6651 (8.166%) 1.9887 (4.340%) 2.6537 (5.273%) 1.0843
6% 1804.54 (6.866%) 4137.43 (4.788%) 0.6220 (10.108%) 1.9179 (5.512%) 2.5399 (6.601%) 1.1183
7% 1732.71 (8.526%) 3989.50 (5.878%) 0.5810 (12.165%) 1.8466 (6.795%) 2.4276 (8.033%) 1.1526
8% 1660.39 (10.358%) 3840.96 (7.061%) 0.5421 (14.344%) 1.7749 (8.195%) 2.3170 (9.574%) 1.1867
9% 1587.85 (12.371%) 3692.26 (8.341%) 0.5050 (16.650%) 1.7031 (9.717%) 2.2082 (11.229%) 1.2205
10% 1515.38 (14.575%) 3543.82 (9.722%) 0.4699 (19.091%) 1.6314 (11.365%) 2.1014 (13.004%) 1.2539
Impact of the Chinese Policy
t D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
1% 2145.01 (0.719%) 4854.68 (0.643%) 0.8580 (1.423%) 2.2608 (0.670%) 3.1188 (0.876%) 0.9533
2% 2077.40 (1.546%) 4718.13 (1.364%) 0.8063 (2.932%) 2.1945 (1.428%) 3.0008 (1.828%) 0.9866
3% 2007.92 (2.486%) 4578.91 (2.165%) 0.7568 (4.531%) 2.1266 (2.278%) 2.8835 (2.860%) 1.0208
4% 1936.82 (3.547%) 4437.42 (3.050%) 0.7094 (6.225%) 2.0575 (3.225%) 2.7670 (3.978%) 1.0557
5% 1864.37 (4.735%) 4294.04 (4.022%) 0.6641 (8.020%) 1.9874 (4.272%) 2.6515 (5.186%) 1.0911
6% 1790.86 (6.055%) 4149.18 (5.086%) 0.6209 (9.919%) 1.9163 (5.423%) 2.5373 (6.489%) 1.1270
7% 1716.58 (7.516%) 4003.25 (6.243%) 0.5798 (11.929%) 1.8447 (6.684%) 2.4245 (7.893%) 1.1632
8% 1641.82 (9.124%) 3856.65 (7.499%) 0.5407 (14.054%) 1.7727 (8.058%) 2.3134(9.402%) 1.1995
9% 1566.88 (10.886%) 3709.81 (8.856%) 0.5035 (16.300%) 1.7005 (9.549%) 2.2040 (11.022%) 1.2357
10% 1492.06 (12.811%) 3563.13 (10.320%) 0.4683 (18.674%) 1.6285 (11.163%) 2.0968 (12.757%) 1.2718
xi
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Table J: Gamma Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the market
share of the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the
value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
Market Share
of Type-L Auto
DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
10% 5594.46 (4.760%) 612.05 (3.787%) 0.7419 (8.829%) 2.2815 (4.681%) 3.0234 (5.669%) 1.0986
20% 4974.65 (4.798%) 1224.09 (3.787%) 0.7291 (8.728%) 2.2327 (4.630%) 2.9618 (5.610%) 1.0965
30% 4354.84 (4.847%) 1836.14 (3.787%) 0.7163 (8.623%) 2.1839 (4.577%) 2.9002 (5.548%) 1.0943
40% 3735.04 (4.912%) 2448.18 (3.787%) 0.7035 (8.515%) 2.1351 (4.522%) 2.8386 (5.484%) 1.0920
50% 3115.23 (5.003%) 3060.23 (3.787%) 0.6907 (8.403%) 2.0863 (4.464%) 2.7769 (5.417%) 1.0896
60% 2495.43 (5.139%) 3672.27 (3.787%) 0. 6779 (8.287%) 2.0375 (4.404%) 2.7153 (5.347%) 1.0869
70% 1875.62 (5.367%) 4284.32 (3.787%) 0. 6650 (8.166%) 1.9887 (4.340%) 2.6537 (5.273%) 1.0841
80% 1255.81 (5.822%) 4896.36 (3.787%) 0.6522 (8.041%) 1.9398 (4.274%) 2.5921 (5.197%) 1.0811
90% 636.01 (7.187%) 5508.41 (3.787%) 0.6394 (7.912%) 1.8910 (4.204%) 2.5304 (5.116%) 1.0779
Impact of the Chinese Policy
Market Share
of Type-L Auto
D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
10% 5593.11 (4.735%) 613.43 (4.022%) 0.7416 (8.790%) 2.2814 (4.677%) 3.0231 (5.657%) 1.1069
20% 4971.65 (4.735%) 1226.87 (4.022%) 0.7287 (8.672%) 2.2324 (4.617%) 2.9612 (5.586%) 1.1047
30% 4350.20 (4.735%) 1840.30 (4.022%) 0.7158 (8.551%) 2.1834 (4.554%) 2.8992 (5.513%) 1.1023
40% 3728.74 (4.735%) 2453.74 (4.022%) 0.7029 (8.425%) 2.1344 (4.488%) 2.8373 (5.436%) 1.0998
50% 3107.28 (4.735%) 3067.17 (4.022%) 0.6900 (8.294%) 2.0854 (4.419%) 2.7754 (5.356%) 1.0971
60% 2485.83 (4.735%) 3680.61 (4.022%) 0.6771 (8.159%) 2.0364 (4.347%) 2.7134 (5.273%) 1.0942
70% 1864.37 (4.735%) 4294.04 (4.022%) 0.6641 (8.020%) 1.9874 (4.272%) 2.6515 (5.186%) 1.0911
80% 1242.91 (4.735%) 4907.48 (4.022%) 0.6512 (7.874%) 1.9383 (4.193%) 2.5896 (5.095%) 1.0878
90% 621.46 (4.735%) 5520.91 (4.022%) 0.6383 (7.724%) 1.8893 (4.110%) 2.5276 (4.999%) 1.0842
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Table K: Gamma Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the shape k1
of the consumers valuations H on the Type-H automobile and L on the Type-L automobile.
Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the value (which is given outside the
brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
kH kL DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
65 45 1295.69 (8.027%) 2671.73 (5.997%) 0.3354 (10.404%) 1.2874 (6.754%) 1.6228 (7.489%) 1.6092
66 46 1442.65 (7.311%) 3074.23 (5.399%) 0.4051 (9.799%) 1.4633 (6.098%) 1.8684 (6.879%) 1.4571
67 47 1589.74 (6.629%) 3482.92 (4.830%) 0.4833 (9.221%) 1.6410 (5.476%) 2.1244 (6.306%) 1.3194
68 48 1734.75 (5.980%) 3889.08 (4.292%) 0.5701 (8.678%) 1.8173 (4.890%) 2.3873 (5.770%) 1.1955
69 49 1875.62 (5.367%) 4284.32 (3.787%) 0.6650 (8.166%) 1.9887 (4.340%) 2.6537 (5.273%) 1.0841
70 50 2010.48 (4.789%) 4661.08 (3.315%) 0.7679 (7.685%) 2.1523 (3.827%) 2.9202 (4.814%) 0.9843
71 51 2137.75 (4.248%) 5013.05 (2.878%) 0.8781 (7.234%) 2.3056 (3.350%) 3.1837 (4.393%) 0.8953
72 52 2256.16 (3.744%) 5335.42 (2.476%) 0.9952 (6.811%) 2.4467 (2.911%) 3.4418 (4.009%) 0.8162
73 53 2364.80 (3.278%) 5625.00 (2.109%) 1.1183 (6.416%) 2.5743 (2.509%) 3.6926 (3.662%) 0.7463
74 54 2463.11 (2.849%) 5880.22 (1.779%) 1.2467 (6.047%) 2.6877 (2.144%) 3.9345 (3.350%) 0.6849
Impact of the Chinese Policy
kH kL D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
65 45 1283.99 (7.051%) 2680.93 (6.362%) 0.3346 (10.148%) 1.2858 (6.619%) 1.6204 (7.329%) 1.6289
66 46 1430.80 (6.430%) 3083.86 (5.729%) 0.4043 (9.574%) 1.4617 (5.985%) 1.8660 (6.743%) 1.4724
67 47 1577.91 (5.836%) 3492.79 (5.127%) 0.4825 (9.028%) 1.6396 (5.382%) 2.1220 (6.189%) 1.3314
68 48 1723.13 (5.270%) 3898.98 (4.558%) 0.5692 (8.510%) 1.8159 (4.810%) 2.3850 (5.700%) 1.2047
69 49 1864.37 (4.735%) 4294.04 (4.022%) 0.6641 (8.020%) 1.9874 (4.272%) 2.6515 (5.186%) 1.0911
70 50 1999.75 (4.229%) 4670.43 (3.522%) 0.7670 (7.557%) 2.1510 (3.768%) 2.9180 (4.738%) 0.9897
71 51 2127.65 (3.755%) 5021.87 (3.059%) 0.8772 (7.122%) 2.3044 (3.299%) 3.1817 (4.325%) 0.8993
72 52 2246.80 (3.313%) 5343.57 (2.632%) 0.9943 (6.714%) 2.4456 (2.866%) 3.4399 (3.949%) 0.8193
73 53 2356.24 (2.904%) 5632.38 (2.243%) 1.1174 (6.334%) 2.5733 (2.469%) 3.6907 (3.609%) 0.7489
74 54 2455.39 (2.527%) 5886.78 (1.893%) 1.2459 (5.979%) 2.6868 (2.109%) 3.9328 (3.304%) 0.6872
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Table L: Gamma Distribution for ConsumersValuations: A sensitivity analysis on the scale k2
of the consumers valuations H on the Type-H automobile and L on the Type-L automobile.
Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the value (which is given outside the
brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
k2 DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
503 1273.24 (8.414%) 3098.40 (5.541%) 0.3704 (10.172%) 1.4070 (6.499%) 1.7773 (7.244%) 1.5684
511 1429.20 (7.558%) 3405.84 (5.055%) 0.4354 (9.626%) 1.5577 (5.903%) 1.9931 (6.695%) 1.4244
519 1583.14 (6.767%) 3708.07 (4.601%) 0.5063 (9.108%) 1.7061 (5.345%) 2.2124 (6.183%) 1.2969
527 1732.63 (6.038%) 4001.83 (4.179%) 0.5830 (8.623%) 1.8503 (4.824%) 2.4333 (5.710%) 1.1841
535 1875.62 (5.367%) 4284.32 (3.787%) 0.6650 (8.166%) 1.9887 (4.340%) 2.6537 (5.273%) 1.0841
543 2010.44 (4.752%) 4553.27 (3.423%) 0.7522 (7.737%) 2.1199 (3.892%) 2.8721 (4.872%) 0.9955
551 2135.87 (4.191%) 4806.94 (3.086%) 0.8440 (7.335%) 2.2430 (3.478%) 3.0870 (4.505%) 0.9168
559 2251.08 (3.680%) 5044.08 (2.776%) 0.9401 (6.956%) 2.3574 (3.098%) 3.2975 (4.169%) 0.8469
567 2355.66 (3.218%) 5263.94 (2.490%) 1.0401 (6.599%) 2.4626 (2.750%) 3.5026 (3.864%) 0.7849
575 2449.53 (2.802%) 5466.19 (2.228%) 1.1434 (6.261%) 2.5584 (2.433%) 3.7019 (3.586%) 0.7296
Impact of the Chinese Policy
k2 D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
503 1261.21 (7.390%) 3108.36 (5.880%) 0.3698 (10.001%) 1.4055 (6.383%) 1.7752 (7.117%) 1.5775
511 1417.08 (6.646%) 3415.92 (5.365%) 0.4347 (9.457%) 1.5562 (5.799%) 1.9909 (6.577%) 1.4327
519 1571.13 (5.957%) 3718.14 (4.885%) 0.5056 (8.947%) 1.7046 (5.253%) 2.2102 (6.076%) 1.3047
527 1720.92 (5.321%) 4011.77 (4.438%) 0.5822 (8.468%) 1.8489 (4.745%) 2.4310 (5.613%) 1.1914
535 1864.37 (4.735%) 4294.04 (4.022%) 0.6641 (8.020%) 1.9874 (4.272%) 2.6515 (5.186%) 1.0911
543 1999.78 (4.197%) 4562.68 (3.637%) 0.7512 (7.600%) 2.1187 (3.834%) 2.8699 (4.794%) 1.0023
551 2125.90 (3.705%) 4815.96 (3.280%) 0.8430 (7.208%) 2.2420 (3.430%) 3.0850 (4.436%) 0.9236
559 2241.88 (3.257%) 5052.65 (2.950%) 0.9391 (6.843%) 2.3565 (3.059%) 3.2956 (4.110%) 0.8539
567 2347.26 (2.850%) 5272.01 (2.647%) 1.0391 (6.503%) 2.4618 (2.720%) 3.5009 (3.814%) 0.7923
575 2441.95 (2.484%) 5473.73 (2.369%) 1.1426(6.186%) 2.5578 (2.410%) 3.7005 (3.547%) 0.7379
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Appendix C Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. To nd the GNB retail price pr for the consumer with the parameter 
and the tax rate i, we should solve the constrained maximization problem in (1), where we need
to compare the cuto¤ level A and the retail price pr. Thus, we analyze the constrained problem
for each of the following two cases, pr  A and pr  A; and then compare the maximum values
obtained for the two cases to determine the optimal retail price maximizing  in (1). Note that
when pr = A, the function  is the same for the two cases.
1. If pr  A, then we can rewrite the maximization problem in (1) as
max
pr
  f [1+(1 i)t]prg1 [(1 T )(pr w)], s.t.   [1+(1 i)t]pr and pr  w. (38)
Di¤erentiating  in (38) once and twice w.r.t. pr, we have
d
dpr
= (1 T )f  [1 + (1  i)t][pr  (1 )w]gf  [1 + (1  i)t]prg (pr w) 1, (39)
and
d2
dp2r
=  [1 + (1  i)t](1  T )f   [1 + (1  i)t]prg (pr   w) 1
+ (1  T )f   [1 + (1  i)t][pr   (1  )w]gf[1 + (1  i)t]f
  [1 + (1  i)t]prg  1(pr   w) 1 + (  1)f   [1 + (1  i)t]prg (pr   w) 2g.
We can nd that at any point (the value of pr) satisfying d=dpr = 0,   [1+(1 i)t][pr 
(1   )w] = 0, and thus the second-order derivative is d2=dp2r < 0. It thus follows that
when pr  A,  is a quasi-concave function of the retail price pr. Temporarily ignore the
constraints in (38). Equating d=dpr in (39) to zero and solving the resulting equation for
pr, we nd a unique maximizing value as pr = =[1 + (1   i)t] + (1   )w. Since pr  A,
the optimal retail price for the problem (38) when pr  A, denoted by pr1, can be written as
pr1 = minfA; =[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )wg. (40)
Next, we derive the condition under which pr1 in (40) satises the constraints in (38). It is
easy to nd that, in order to satisfy the constraints that   [1 + (1 i)t]pr and pr  w, the
retail price must be determined such that w  pr  =[1 + (1  i)t]. However, this requires
that =[1 + (1   i)t]  w, or,   [1 + (1   i)t]w. Otherwise, if  < [1 + (1   i)t]w, then
no retail price can satisfy the condition that w  pr  =[1 + (1  i)t], and the retailer and
the consumer cannot complete any transaction.
We nd from (40) that under the condition that   [1+(1 i)t]w, if A  =[1+(1 i)t]+
(1  )w or   ^i  [A  (1  )w][1 + (1  i)t]=, then pr = =[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )w
must satisfy the constraints in (38). However, if ^i    , then pr1 = A and the consumers
and the retailers functions can thus be written as
u(pr1; ; i) =    [1 + (1  i)t]A and R(pr1; ; i) = (1  T )(A  w).
Since A  w, the retailers prot R(pr1; ; i) must be greater than or equal to zero, i.e.,
R(pr1; ; i)  0. However, whether or not u(pr1; ; i) is non-negative depends on the sign
of    [1 + (1  i)t]A. Note that, for this case,
  ^i = [A  (1  )w][1 + (1  i)t]=  [1 + (1  i)t]A,
because A  w. This means that, if ^i    , then the retailer and the consumer should
be willing to complete their transaction with the retail price A.
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Summarizing the above, we nd that when pr  A, the optimal retail price is given as
pr1 =

=[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )w, if [1 + (1  i)t]w    ^i,
A, if ^i    . (41)
2. If pr  A, then we rewrite the maximization problem in (1) as
max
pr
  [ (1+t)pr+itA]1 [(1 T )(pr w)], s.t.   (1+t)pr itA and pr  w. (42)
Similar to our analysis for the case that pr  A, we nd that when pr  A,  is also a
quasi-concave function of the retail price pr with a unique maximizing value pr2 as
pr2 = max[A; ( + itA)=(1 + t) + (1  )w]. (43)
It is easy to nd that, in order to satisfy the constraints in (42), the retail price must be
determined such that w  pr  ( + itA)=(1 + t). This requires that   (1 + t)w   itA.
Otherwise, if  < (1 + t)w   itA, then the retailer and the consumer cannot complete their
transaction.
We nd from (43) that under the condition that   (1 + t)w itA, if A  (+itA)=(1 +
t)+(1 )w or   i  [A  (1 )w](1+ t)= itA [which is not less than (1+ t)w itA,
i.e., i  (1 + t)w  itA], then pr2 = ( + itA)=(1 + t) + (1  )w, which must satisfy the
constraints in (42). However, if   i, then pr2 = A, and the consumers and the retailers
functions can thus be written as
u(pr2; ; i) =    [1 + (1  i)t]A and R(pr2; ; i) = (1  T )(A  w).
Since A  w, the retailers prot R(pr2; ; i) must be greater than or equal to zero, i.e.,
R(pr2; ; i)  0. Noting that i  [1 + (1   i)t]A  (1 + t)w   itA, we nd that, if
[1 + (1   i)t]A    i, then u(pr2; ; i) is non-negative and the consumer buys from
the retailer with the retail price A. Otherwise, if  < [1 + (1   i)t]A, then the consumer
abandons his or her purchase from the retailer.
In summary, we nd that, when pr  A, the optimal retail price is given as
pr2 =

A, if [1 + (1  i)t]A    i,
( + itA)=(1 + t) + (1  )w, if i    . (44)
To nd the optimal retail price pr for the constrained maximization problem in (1), we need
to compare the optimal retail price under the constraints that pr  A and pr  A. Note that
^i  i =  it(1 )(A w)=  0. Thus, we nd that [1 + (1 i)t]w  [1 + (1 i)t]A  ^i  i.
We consider the following ve cases:
1. If 0   < [1 + (1  i)t]w, then we nd from the above analysis that the two players cannot
reach an agreement on the retail price.
2. If [1 + (1  i)t]w    [1 + (1  i)t]A, then, under the constraint that pr  A, the retailer
and the consumer choose their retail price as =[1 + (1   i)t] + (1   )w, as indicated
by (41). However, under the constraint that pr  A, the two players do not complete the
transaction. Thus, for this case, the consumer should buy from the retailer with the retail
price ~pr  =[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )w.
3. If [1 + (1   i)t]A    ^i, then, under the constraint that pr  A, the retail price for the
consumer is determined as ~pr, as indicated by (41); and under the constraint that pr  A,
the retail price is A, as indicated by (44). Thus, the optimal retail price is ~pr.
4. If ^i    i, then, as indicated by (41) and (44), the retail price is A under the constraint
that pr  A and A under the constraint that pr  A. It thus follows that for  2 [^i; i], the
optimal retail price is A.
5. If i    , then we learn from (41) and (44) that the retail price is A under the constraint
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that pr  A, whereas the retail price is p^r  (+itA)=(1+t)+(1 )w under the constraint
that pr  A. Therefore, the optimal retail price for  2 [i; ] is p^r.
In conclusion, we obtain the optimal retail price as given in (2). This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. This proof consists of two parts.
Part I Change in  after the policy is implemented.
We can compare 0(i) and (i) [which is given as in (4)], and note that 0(i) is equal to
(i) when i = 0. We calculate the rst-order derivative of (i) w.r.t i as,
@(i)
@i
=
@
@i
"Z ^i
~i
~prf()d +

F (i)  F (^i)

A+
Z 
i
p^rf()d
#,
1  F (~i)

=
t
[1 + (1  i)t]

1  F (~i)
 ( 1  ~if(~i)
1  F (~i)
!Z ^i
~i

1 + (1  i)tf()d+
+
Z 
i
(
A [1 + (1  i)t]
1 + t
 
~if(~i)
1  F (~i)

 + itA
1 + t
  w
)
f()d
 
~if(~i)
1  F (~i)

F (i)  F (^i)
 A  w

 

F (^i)  F (~i)

w
)
=
t
[1 + (1  i)t]

1  F (~i)
 ( 1
1 + (1  i)t
Z ^i
~i
f()d +
A [1 + (1  i)t]
1 + t
 
1  F (i)

 
~if(~i)
1  F (~i)
"
1
1 + (1  i)t
Z ^i
~i

   ~i

f()d
+
1
1 + t
Z 
i
 
   i

f()d +

1  F (^i)
 A  w

#)
.
It follows that @(i)=@i < 0 when
~if(~i)
1  F (~i)
>
1
1+(1 i)t
R ^i
~i
f()d + A[1+(1 i)t]1+t
 
1  F (i)

1
1+(1 i)t
R ^i
~i

   ~i

f()d +
1
1 + t
R 
i
 
   i

f()d +

1  F (^i)

A w

. (45)
As Lariviere [23] discussed, f()= (1  F ()) with  = ~i on the left hand side of the above
inequality is the generalized failure rate,which is also the elasticity of demand, and is greater than
1 when the consumer demand is price elastic. Demand for automobiles is generally price elastic.
For example, Goodwin et al. [18] showed that the price elasticity of Ford compact automobile is 2.8.
When (45) holds for all i (1  i  n), we can nd that (i) < 0(i), and  =
Pn+1
i=1 (i  (i)) <Pn+1
i=1
 
i  0(i)

= 0.
Part II Impact of the cuto¤ level A on D, M , R, and :
When the cuto¤ level A  w, increasing A will not a¤ect the value of ~i, i.e., the minimum
valuation of the consumers who are willing to purchase an automobile. This means that increasing
A when A  w will not a¤ect the expected sales D and thus the manufacturers expected prot
M .
We now examine the impact of A on the expected retail price  and the retailers expected
prot R in the automobile market segment. Taking the rst-order derivatives of  in (3) and R
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in (5) w.r.t. the cuto¤ level A, we obtain that
@
@A
=
Xn
i=1

i  @(i)
@A

,
@R
@A
= B(1  T )
Xn
i=1

i 

1  F (~i)

 @(i)
@A

.
From Theorem 1, we nd the following results. If A  =[1+(1 i)t]+(1 )w, then ^i  ,
and the negotiated retail price pr for the consumer with the tax rate i is ~pr for any  2 [~i; ]. It
follows that
(i) =
 Z 
~i
~prf()d
!,
1  F (~i)

and
@(i)
@A
= 0.
If

 + (1  )(1 + t)w =(1 + t  it)  A  =[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )w, then ^i    i, and
(i) =
"Z ^i
~i
~prf()d +

1  F (^i)

A
#,
1  F (~i)

and
@(i)
@A
= 1.
If A   + (1  )(1 + t)w =(1 + t  it), then   i, and
@(i)
@A
=
F (i)  F (^i)
1  F (~i)
+
it
 
1  F (i)

(1 + t)

1  F (~i)
 > 0.
Hence, if A  A  =[1 + (1   n)t] + (1   )w, then @=@A = 0 and @R=@A = 0; if A < A,
then @=@A > 0 and @R=@A > 0.
The above results imply that, for a type of automobile, when the cuto¤ level A is su¢ ciently
large such that A  A, increasing the value of A will not a¤ect the expected retail price  and the
retailers expected after-tax prot R; but, when A < A, increasing the value of A will raise both
 and R.
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. We nd from (14) that   1 if S   (1   T )Pj2fH;Lg(Bjxj)  0, which
can be specied, using (12) and (13), as follows:
 
X
j2fH;Lg
h
Bj
Xn+1
i=1

ji  j(i)
i
 0, (46)
where
j(i) 

1  Fj(~ji )

 [(1  it)j(i)  cj ] + i  t
Z j
ji
(p^jr  A)fj()d, (47)
and
0 
X
j2fH;Lg
h
Bj

1  Fj(j0)

 (j0   cj)
i
.
Note that 0 is the value of  when i = 0 (for i = 1; : : : ; n+ 1) for any value of A (or equivalently,
when the U.S. policy is not executed). In the above formula for 0, 
j
0  (1+ t)wj . Next, we derive
a su¢ cient condition for the cost-e¤ectiveness of the U.S. policy following two steps.
Step 1 Show that A = wH or any A  AH are local maximizers of .
To examine the property of the function , we calculate the rst- and second-order derivatives
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of  w.r.t. A as
@
@A
=
X
j2fH;Lg
Bj
Xn
i=1

ji j(i)

,
@2
@A2
=
X
j2fH;Lg
Bj
j
Xn
i=1

ji

fj(
j
i )

1  jit
1 + t

(1 + t  jit)  fj(^ji )(1  it)[1 + (1  i)t]

,
where
 j(i)  (1  it)

1  Fj(^ji )

 

1  jit
1 + t

1  Fj(ji )

.
For any i 2 (0; 1), when A = wj , the threshold ^i = i, thus
 j(i) =  it

1  Fj(^ji )

1  j
1 + t

< 0.
It follows that when A  maxfAj j(i)  0 for i 2 (0; 1)g, @=@A < 0. The value of  can be a
local maximum at A = wH since we only consider A  wH .
When A  AH  H H=[1 + (1   n)t] + (1   H)wH , we nd that ^ji  j (the maximum
valuation for the Type-j automobile), for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and j = H;L; hence  j(i) = 0, and
@=@A = 0, meaning that any A  AH results in the same value of . Because ^ji  ji  j , it is
obvious that when A! AH and A  AH ,  j(i)  0 and @=@A  0, indicating that the value of
 is at least a local maximum at any A  AH .
We calculate the value of  when A = wH and that when A = AH , and obtain that
jA=wH   jA= AH =
X
j2fH;Lg
h
Bj
Xn
i=1
ji 
 
j(i)jA=wH   j(i)jA= AH
i
,
where
H(i)jA=wH   H(i)jA= AH =
Z H
~Hi

H( + itwH)
1 + t
+ (1  H   it)wH

 (1  it)

H
1 + (1  i)t + (1  H)wH

fH()d
=
Hit
2
(1 + t) [1 + (1  i)t]
(Z H
~Hi
fH()d   wH [1 + (1  i)t]

1  FH(~Hi )
)
 0;
and
L(i)jA=wH   L(i)jA= AH = (1  it)
"Z Li
^Li
(wH   ~pLr )fL()d
#
+
Lit
1 + t
Z L
Li

t
1 + (1  i)t
+wH   (1 + t)wH   (1  )wL
L

fL()d. (48)
In the above equation,
R Li
^Li
(wH   ~pLr )fL()d  0; when  = Li ,
t
1 + (1  i)t + wH   (1 + t)
wH   (1  L)wL
L

=  (1 + t)(1  L)(1  it)
L[1 + (1  i)t] (wH   wL) < 0,
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and thus, the termZ L
Li

t
1 + (1  i)t + wH   (1 + t)
wH   (1  L)wL
L

fL()d
can be positive or negative. Therefore, the sign of L(i)jA=wH L(i)jA= AH and that of jA=wH 
jA= AH can be either positive or negative.
Let L(Aji)  L(i)jA   L(i)jA= AH , which can be specied as in (48) by replacing wH
with A. The rst-order derivative of L(Aji) is calculated as,
@L(Aji)
@A
= (1  it)

1 +
A  wL
L[1 + (1  i)t] ([1 + (1  i)t]
2   it (1 + t  Lit)
(1  L))]

FL(
L
i )  FL(^Li )

+ it

 

1  L
1 + t

+
A  wL
L[1 + (1  i)t] (1 + t  Lit) (1  L) (1  it)
  
1  FL(Li )

.
We nd that at A = wL, ^Li = 
L
i , and
@L(Aji)=@AjA=wL =  it

1  L
1 + t
 
1  FL(Li )

< 0;
and, when A > wL and A   wL is su¢ ciently large, @L(Aji)=@A > 0. Therefore, it follows
that, depending on the values of BH and BL (i.e., the sizes of the high-end and low-end automobile
market segments) and how close the value of wH is to wL, the net benet of the tax-reduction
policy when A = wH may be higher or lower than that when A = AH . According to the proof of
Theorem 2, we nd that jA for any A > AH is equal to jA= AH because increasing the value of A
when A > AH will not a¤ect the retail price j(i). Therefore, the optimal A maximizing  could
be equal to wH or any A  AH (in particular, A =1).
Step 2 Derive the su¢ cient condition for the cost-e¤ectiveness of the U.S. policy.
When A = AH , we have
jA= AH =
X
j2fH;Lg
(
Bj
Xn+1
i=1
ji
"
(1  it)
 Z j
~ji
~pjrfj()d
!
  cj

1  Fj(~ji )
#)
, (49)
and
jA= AH   0 =
X
j2fH;Lg
(
Bj
Xn
i=1
ji
(
j
1 + (1  i)t
"
(1  it)
Z j0
~ji
(   ~ji )fj()d
 it
Z j
j0

t
1 + t
  ~ji

fj()d
#
  itwj

1  Fj(~ji )

+ (wj   cj)

Fj(
j
0)  Fj(~ji )
))
.
When A = wH , we have
jA=wH =
X
j2fH;Lg
(
Bj
Xn+1
i=1
ji
(
H
1 + t
Z H
~Hi
(   ~Hi )fH()d + [wH(1  it)  cH ]

1  FH(~Hi )

+
L
1 + t
"
(1  it)(1 + t)
1 + (1  i)t
Z ^Li
~Li

   ~Li

fL()d +
Z L
Li
h
   ~Li + it(wH   wL)
i
fL()d
#
+(wH   wL)
h
FL(
L
i )  (1  it)FL(^Li )  it
i
+ [wL(1  it)  cL]

1  FL(~Li )
oo
,
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and
jA=wH   0 =
X
j2fH;Lg
(
Bj
Xn
i=1
ji
(
H
1 + t
"Z H
~Hi
(   ~Hi )fH()d  
Z H
H0
(   H0 )fH()d
#
  wHit

1  FH(~Hi )

+ (wH   cH)

FH(
H
0 )  FH(~Hi )

+
L
1 + t

(1  it)(1 + t)
1 + (1  i)t

Z ^Li
~Li

   ~Li

fL()d +
Z L
Li
h
   ~Li + it(wH   wL)
i
fL()d  
Z L
L0
(   L0 )fL()d
#
+ (wH   wL)
h
FL(
L
i )  (1  it)FL(^Li )  it
i
  wLit

1  FL(~Li )

+(wL   cL)

FL(
L
0 )  FL(~Li )
oo
.
Therefore, jA= AH 0  0 if
P
j2fH;Lg

Bjj'
1
j ()

Pj2fH;Lg Bj1j (), and jA=wH 0  0
if
P
j2fH;Lg

Bjj'
2
j ()

 Pj2fH;Lg Bj2j (), where 'lj() and lj() are dened as in the
theorem.
As shown in the main body of this paper, the highest sales tax rate t is 9.75% in Los Angeles.
Thus for   j , t1+t   ~ji < 0 because the highest valuation for the Type-j automobile (i.e.,
j) is unlikely to be more than 10 times the minimum valuation of consumers who purchase
the automobile (i.e., ~ji ). Moreover, we nd from online Table A that the largest value of i is
0.33, so it < 0:033. Therefore, '1j () should be positive. It is obvious that '
2
j () > 0 because
~ji < 
j
0. The sign of 
1
j () depends on whether or not
Pn
i=1
h
ji itwj

1  Fj(~ji )
i
is greater thanPn
i=1
h
ji (wj   cj)

Fj(
j
0)  Fj(~ji )
i
. If 1j () < 0 for j = H;L, then j'
1
j () must be greater
than 1j () when the U.S. tax reduction policy with a su¢ ciently large cuto¤ level (e.g., A = AH)
or the policy without a cuto¤ level (i.e., A = 1) is executed. If 1j () < '1j (), then a su¢ cient
condition for the policy to be cost e¤ective is
P
j2fH;Lg

Bjj'
1
j ()

 Pj2fH;Lg Bj1j (). If
1j () > 1 for j = H;L, then a cost-e¤ective tax reduction policy may not exist. Similar discussion
can be made for the sign of 2j (). This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 4. According to Theorem 2, we nd that the prot increase jM + 
j
R
corresponding to the Type-j automobile is increasing in the cuto¤ level A when A < Aj  j j=[1+
(1 n)t]+(1 j)wj (j = H;L); since AL < AH , the system-wide additional prot S is increasing
in A when A < AH . Moreover, when A  AH , S and thus the prot-cost ratio  remain constant.
Theorem 3 indicates that if the two conditions in (15) in Theorem 3 are satised, then there must
exist a cuto¤ level such that   1. We also note from the proof of Theorem 3 that one of the
conditions in Theorem 3 is derived when A = AH ; that is, when both conditions in Theorem 3
apply, the optimal cuto¤ level maximizing S must be greater than or equal to AH . It thus follows
that the constraint that A  w is redundant.
Proof of Theorem 5. To nd the retail price negotiated by the consumer and the retailer, we
construct the GNB model as
maxpr  = f   [1 + (1  ) t] prg1 [(1  T )(pr   w)]
s.t.    [1 + (1  ) t] pr  0 and (1  T )(pr   w)  0.
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Di¤erentiating  once and twice w.r.t. pr gives
@
@pr
=  (1  )[1 + (1  ) t]f   [1 + (1  ) t] prg [(1  T )(pr   w)]
+ (1  T )f   [1 + (1  ) t] prg1 [(1  T )(pr   w)] 1,
@2
@p2r
=  (1  )[1 + (1  ) t]2f   [1 + (1  ) t] prg  1[(1  T )(pr   w)]
  (1  )(1  T )2f   [1 + (1  ) t] prg1 [(1  T )(pr   w)] 2.
Note that @2=@p2r  0; thus,  is a concave function with a unique optimal solution as p^r in (25).
Using the argument in the proof of Theorem 1, we can then prove this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6. We examine the impact of  on the expected retail price ^ and the retailers
and the manufacturers expected prots ^R and ^M . Taking the rst-order derivative of ^ in (27)
w.r.t. the reduction percentage  gives
@^
@
=
8<: wt[1 + (1  )t]1  F (^)
9=; , where   f(^)^ +
"
1
^
  f(^)
1  F (^)
#Z 
^
f()d.
Note that @^=@ may be positive or negative, depending on the condition that   0. SinceR 
^ f()d > ^

1  F (^)

, we nd that if 1   F (^) > ^f(^), or, ^f(^)
.
1  F (^)

< 1, then
 > 1   F (^) > 0; otherwise,  < 1   F (^). As Lariviere [23] discussed, ^f(^)
.
1  F (^)

is a
generalized failure rate,which is smaller than 1 when the consumer demand is price inelastic.
The rst-order derivative of  w.r.t.  is obtained as follows:
@
@
=
tw
1  F (^)
8><>:
2641  F (^)
(^)2
+ f 0(^) +

f(^)
2
1  F (^)
375Z 
^
f()d
  ^

1  F (^)
264

f(^)
2
1  F (^) + f
0(^)
375
9>=>;
 tw
1  F (^)
8><>:
2641  F (^)
(^)2
+ f 0(^) +

f(^)
2
1  F (^)
375 ^ 1  F (^)
  ^

1  F (^)
264

f(^)
2
1  F (^) + f
0(^)
375
9>=>;
=
tw
^

1  F (^)

,
which is non-negative. Therefore,  is increasing in .
It is easy to nd that D^ = B

1  F (^)

 where ^ = [1 + (1   )t]w is increasing in . We
di¤erentiate ^R in (28) and ^M in (29) w.r.t. , and have
@^R
@
=
Btw(1  T )
1 + (1  )t
"
[1 + (1  )t]f(^)(w   1) +
R 
^ f()d
^
#
 0,
@^M
@
= Btw(1  T )(w   c)f(^)  0,
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which imply that, if the reduction percentage  is increased, then both the retailers and the
manufacturers expected prots rise. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 7. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, we nd that ^  1 if and only if
S^  Pj2fH;Lg(Bj x^j)(1  T )  0 or the condition in Theorem 7 is satised.
Because the second term of 1j is equal to the rst term of 
1
j at  = 0, we calculate the
rst-order derivative of the rst term w.r.t.  as,
@
@
"
1  t
1 + (1  )t
Z j
^j
(   ^j)fj()d
#
=
t
[1 + (1  )t]2
Z j
^j
n
[1 + (1  )t] ^j   t
o
fj()d.
Note that ^j > w and the original vehicle sales tax rate t is 10%. Since the maximum valuation
of a consumer (i.e., j) is unlikely to be as high as 10 times the wholesale price w, we nd that
[1 + (1  )t] ^j   t > 0 for  2 [^j ; j ], and the above rst-order derivative is positive. It follows
that 1j is generally increasing in  and is positive.
Similarly, we calculate the rst-order derivative of the rst term in 2j w.r.t.  as
@
@
n
[(1  t)wj   cj ]

1  Fj(^j)
o
=  tw

1  Fj(^j)
(
1  1  t  cj=wj
1 + (1  )t
^jfj(^j)
1  Fj(^j)
)
.
Since the manufacturers prot margin cannot be very large, cj=wj cannot be very small. Unless
^jfj(^j)
.
1  Fj(^j)

is much greater than 1 (i.e., the demand is very price elastic), we nd that
@
@
n
[(1  t)wj   cj ]

1  Fj(^j)
o
< 0, indicating that 2j is generally decreasing in  and is
negative.
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 8. This theorem consists of two parts, in which we derive the negotiated
retail price pH for the consumer who prefers a Type-H automobile and pL for the consumer who
prefers a Type-L automobile.
Part I The Negotiated Retail Price pH for the Consumer who Prefers a Type-H
Automobile
The consumer with the valuation H decides to buy a Type-H automobile if and only if his or
her net gain u(pH ; H ; i) is non-negative and no less than that drawn from purchasing a Type-
L automobile, i.e., u(pH ; H ; i)  maxfu(pL; L; i); 0g. That is, to nd the retail price pH for
the consumer, we should solve the constrained maximization problem in (37), where we need to
compare u(pL; L; i) and 0 to decide on the disagreement payo¤ maxfu(pL; L; i); 0g. Thus, we
analyze two possible cases: (i) u(pL; L; i)  0 and (ii) u(pL; L; i)  0.
Case (i): The negotiated retail price pH when u(pL; L; i)  0
The consumers disagreement payo¤ for his or her bargaining with the retailer over the retail
price of a Type-H automobile is u0H = u(pL; L; i), because, if the consumer does not buy a Type-
H automobile, then he or she should bargain with the retailer over the price pL for the Type-L
automobile. When u(pL; L; i)  0, the consumer will buy a Type-L automobile at the price pL.
Thus the retailers disagreement payo¤ for the bargaining of the price pH is v0H = (1 T )(pL wL).
Summarizing the above, we should use a backward approach to nd the negotiated price pH
and derive the condition assuring that the consumer and the retailer trade the Type-H automobile.
Specically, we take the following two steps to solve our problem.
Step 1: Determine the disagreement payo¤ for Type-H automobile bargaining. Following
our above argument, to nd u0H and v
0
H , we should analyze the Type-L automobile bargain-
ing problem in which the disagreement payo¤s for the consumer and the retailer are zero.
Therefore, the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) model for the negotiation of pL is,
maxpL L  [L   (1 + t)pL + itmin(A; pL)]1 [(1  T )(pL   wL)]
s.t. L   (1 + t)pL + itmin(A; pL)  0 and (1  T )(pL   wL)  0.
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Using the result in Theorem 1, we can nd pL as follows. If 0  L < ~Li  [1 + (1  i)t]wL,
then the retailer and the consumer cannot reach an agreement on the retail price. If   ~Li ,
then the negotiated retail price pL is determined as
pL =
8>>><>>>:
~pL  L
1 + (1  i)t + (1  )wL, if
~Li  L  ^Li ,
A, if ^Li  L  Li ,
p^L  (L + itA)
1 + t
+ (1  )wL, if Li  L  L,
where ^Li  [A  (1  )wL][1 + (1  i)t]= and Li  [A  (1  )wL](1 + t)=  itA. Thus
u0H = u(p

L; L; i) and v
0
H = (1  T )(pL   wL).
Step 2: Find the negotiated retail price pH . Using u0H and v
0
H , we can obtain the negotiated
retail price pH for the consumer, by solving the GNB problem as follows:
maxpH H  [H   (1 + t)pH + itmin(A; pH)  u0H ]1 [(1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H ]
s.t. H   (1 + t)pH + itmin(A; pH)  u0H and (1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H .
(50)
To solve the above problem, we need to compare the cuto¤ level A and the retail price pH . Thus,
we analyze the problem for each of the cases, pH  A and pH  A; and then compare the
maximum values obtained for the two cases to determine the optimal retail price maximizing
H in (50). Note that when pH = A, the function H is the same for the two cases.
1. If pH  A, then we can rewrite the maximization problem in (50) as
maxpH H  fH   [1 + (1  i)t]pH   u0Hg1 [(1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H ]
s.t. H   [1 + (1  i)t]pH  u0H and (1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H .
(51)
Let U  H   [1 + (1  i)t]pH   u0H and V  (1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H . Di¤erentiating
H in (50) once and twice w.r.t. pH , we have
dH
dpH
=  [1 + (1  i)t](1  )U V  + (1  T )U1 V  1,
and
d2H
dp2H
=  (1  )[1 + (1  i)t]2U  1V    (1  )(1  T )[1 + (1  i)t]U V  1
  (1  )[1 + (1  i)t](1  T )U V  1   (1  )(1  T )2U1 V  2
=  (1  )U  1V  2 f[1 + (1  i)t]V + (1  T )Ug2 < 0.
Thus, when pH  A, H is a concave function of pH . Temporarily ignore the constraints
in (51). Equating dH=dpH to zero and solving the resulting equation for pH , we nd
a unique maximizing value as
pH = 
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

.
Since pH  A, the optimal retail price for the problem (51), denoted by pH1, can be
written as
pH1 = minfA; 
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )
g. (52)
Next, we derive the condition under which pH1 in (52) satises the constraints in (51).
The retail price satisfying the constraints must be such that
wH + v
0
H=(1  T )  pH 
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1  i)t]. (53)
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For the case that pH  A to occur, it is required that wH + v0H=(1  T )  A, i.e.,
L  Li  [1 + (1  i)t] [A  (wH   wL)] = < ^Li .
Condition (53) requires that
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1 i)t]  wH +v0H=(1 T ), or, H  ~hi ,
where
~hi  L + [1 + (1  i)t](wH   wL).
Otherwise, if H < ~hi , then no retail price can satisfy condition (53), and the retailer
and the consumer will not complete a transaction of the Type-H automobile.
We nd from (52) that under the condition that H  ~hi , if A  
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1 
i)t] + (1  )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

or H  ^hi , where
^hi  [1 + (1  i)t]

A  (1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T )	 =+ u0H ,
then pH = 
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1   i)t] + (1   )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

must satisfy the
constraints in (51). However, if ^hi  H  H , then pH1 = A, and the consumers and
the retailers payo¤s are
u(pH1; H ; i) = H   [1 + (1  i)t]A and R(pH1; H ; i) = (1  T )(A  wH).
When H  ^hi , pH1 = A satises condition (53), thus A  wH + v0H=(1  T ). It follows
that the retailers prot R(pH1; H ; i)  v0H and u(pH1; H ; i)  u0H . This means
that, if ^hi  H  H , the retailer and the consumer should be willing to complete their
transaction with the retail price A.
Summarizing the above, we nd that when pH  A and ~Li  L  Li , the optimal
retail price is given as
pH1 =
8<:

 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1  i)t]
+(1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T ) , if ~hi  H  ^hi ,
A, if ^hi  H  H .
(54)
2. If pH  A, then we can rewrite the maximization problem in (50) as
maxpH H  [H   (1 + t)pH + itA  u0H ]1 [(1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H ]
s.t. H   (1 + t)pH + itA  u0H and (1  T )(pH   wH)  v0H .
(55)
Similar to our analysis for the case that pH  A, we nd that when pH  A, H is also
a concave function of pH with a unique maximizing value pH2 as
pH2 = max

A; (H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t) + (1  )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )
	
. (56)
In order to satisfy the constraints in (55), the retail price must be determined such
that wH + v0H=(1   T )  pH  (H   u0H + itA)=(1 + t). This requires H 
wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

(1+t) itA+u0H . Otherwise, the retailer and the consumer cannot
complete their transaction of the Type-H automobile.
We nd from (56) that under the condition that H 

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

(1 + t)  
itA+ u
0
H , if A  (H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t) + (1  )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

or H  hi ,
where
hi 

A  (1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T )	 (1 + t)=  itA+ u0H ,
then pH2 = (H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t) + (1  )

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

, which must satisfy
the constraints in (55). However, if H  hi , then pH2 = A, and the consumers and
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the retailers payo¤s are
u(pH2; H ; i) = H   [1 + (1  i)t]A and R(pH2; H ; i) = (1  T )(A  wH).
Similar to our analysis for the case that pH  A, when ~Li  L  Li , we nd pH2 = A 
wH +v
0
H=(1 T ), and the retailers prot R(pH2; H ; i)  v0H . When [1+(1 i)t]A+
u0H  H  hi , u(pH2; H ; i)  u0H and the consumer buys the Type-H automobile at
the price A. Otherwise, if H < [1 + (1  i)t]A+ u0H , then the consumer will not buy
the Type-H automobile.
In summary, when pH  A, the optimal retail price is given as
pH2 =
8>><>>:
A, if [1 + (1  i)t]A+ u0H  H  hi
and ~Li  L  Li ,
(H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T ) , if hi  H  H .
(57)
To nd the optimal retail price pH for the constrained maximization problem in (50), we need to
compare the optimal retail prices under the constraints that pH  A and pH  A. Note that
^hi   hi =  it(1 )

A  wH   v0H=(1  T )

=. Thus, ~hi  [1+(1 i)t]A+u0H  ^hi  hi .
In summary, when u(pL; L; i)  0, i.e., L  ~Li = [1+(1 i)t]wL, we consider the following
ve cases:
1. If 0  H < ~hi , then we nd from the above analysis that the consumer will not buy a
Type-H automobile.
2. If ~hi  H  [1 + (1   i)t]A + u0H , then, under the constraint that pH  A, the
retailer and the consumer choose the retail price as 
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1  i)t] + (1 
)

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

, as indicated by (54). However, under the constraint that pH 
A, the two players do not complete the transaction. Thus, for this case, the consumer
should buy from the retailer at the price ~pH  
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1   i)t] + (1  
)

wH + v
0
H=(1  T )

.
3. If [1 + (1  i)t]A+ u0H  H  ^hi , then, under the constraint that pH  A, the retail
price is ~pH , as indicated by (54); and under the constraint that pH  A, the retail price
is A, as indicated by (57). Thus, the optimal retail price is ~pH .
4. If ^hi  H  hi , then, as indicated by (54) and (57), the retail price is A under the
constraint that pH  A and A under the constraint that pH  A. It thus follows that
for  2 [^hi ; hi ], the optimal retail price is A.
5. If hi  H  H , then we learn from (54) and (57) that the retail price is A under the
constraint that pH  A, whereas the retail price is p^H  (H + itA   u0H)=(1 + t) +
(1   ) wH + v0H=(1  T ) under the constraint that pH  A. Therefore, the optimal
retail price for  2 [hi ; H ] is p^H .
Case (ii): The negotiated retail price pH when u(pL; L; i)  0
When u(pL; L; i)  0, the consumer will not buy a Type-L automobile because there is no
negotiated retail price that can give the consumer a positive payo¤. So the consumers and the
retailers disagreement payo¤s for the bargaining over the price pH are u0H = 0 and v
0
H = 0,
respectively. Then the negotiated retail price pH can be obtained from the result in Case (i) by
letting u0H = v
0
H = 0. The su¢ cient condition for the case that u(pL; L; i)  0 is L  ~Li =
[1 + (1  i)t]wL.
Part II The Negotiated Retail Price pL for the Consumer who Prefers a Type-L
Automobile
Similar to Part I analysis, when u(pH ; H ; i)  0, i.e., H  ~Hi  [1 + (1   i)t]wH , the
consumers and the retailers disagreement payo¤s for the bargaining over pL are u0L = u(p

H ; H ; i)
and v0L = (1  T )(pH   wH). We nd four cases:
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1. If 0  L < ~li  H   [1 + (1   i)t](wH   wL), then the consumer will not buy a Type-L
automobile.
2. If ~li  L  ^li  [1 + (1   i)t]

A  (1  ) wL + v0L=(1  T )	 = + u0L, then the
optimal retail price is ~pL  
 
L   u0L

=[1 + (1  i)t] + (1  )

wL + v
0
L=(1  T )

.
3. If ^li  L  li 

A  (1  ) wL + v0L=(1  T )	 (1 + t)=   itA + u0L, then the
optimal retail price is A.
4. If li  L  L, the optimal retail price is p^L  (L + itA   u0L)=(1 + t) + (1  
)

wL + v
0
L=(1  T )

.
When H  ~Hi , u(pH ; H ; i)  0, and u0L = v0L = 0. Then the negotiated retail price pL can
be obtained from the above result by letting u0L = v
0
L = 0. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 9. To nd the retail price negotiated by the consumer and the retailer, we
construct the GNB model as
maxp^j j 
n
j   [1 + (1  )t]p^j   u^0j
o1 
[(1  T )(p^j   wj)  v^0j ]
s.t. j   [1 + (1  )t]p^j  u^0j and (1  T )(p^j   wj)  v^0j ,
Let U  j   [1 + (1   )t]p^j   u^0j and V  (1   T )(p^j   wj)   v^0j . Di¤erentiating j once and
twice w.r.t. p^j , we have
dj
dp^j
=  [1 + (1  )t](1  )U V  + (1  T )U1 V  1,
and
d2j
dp^2j
=  (1  )U  1V  2 f[1 + (1  )t]V + (1  T )Ug2 < 0.
Thus j is a concave function of p^j . Using the argument in the proof of Theorem 8, we can then
prove this theorem.
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Appendix D Analytical Justications for Remarks 1, 3, and 4
D.1 Justication for Remark 1
We provide our analytical justication for the results in Remark 1 as follows.
D.1.1 Changes in D, M , and R after the policy is implemented.
We examine the impact of the automobile tax reduction policy on the expected sales, the manu-
facturers and the retailers expected prots, and the average retail price in an automobile market
segment. To do this, we need to compute the expected sales, the manufacturers and the retailers
expected prots, and the average retail price before the policy is executed, which are denoted by
D0, 0M , 
0
R, and 
0, respectively. Before the implementation of the policy, each consumer still
bargains with the retailer over his or her retail price. Thus, we use (1) to develop the corresponding
GNB model as
maxpr 0  [   (1 + t)pr]1 [(1  T )(pr   w)]
s.t.    (1 + t)pr  0 and (1  T )(pr   w)  0.
It is easy to nd that the optimal retail price for the consumer with the valuation  which is
denoted by p0r is calculated as p
0
r = =(1 + t) + (1   )w, and the consumer and the retailer
successfully complete their transaction with the probability of 1  F (0), where 0  (1 + t)w. As
a result, we can calculate D0, 0M , 
0
R, and 
0 as
D0 = B (1  F (0)) ,
0M = (1  T )(w   c)D0 = B(1  T )(w   c) (1  F (0)) ,
0R = B  (1  T )
"Z 
0
(p0r   w)f()d
#
,
0 = 0(i) =
 Z 
0
p0rf()d
!,
(1  F (0)) .
Recall that the expected sales after the policy is executed are computed asD = BPn+1i=1 hi  1  F (~i)i.
Since for i  n, ~i = [1 + (1  i)t]w < (1 + t)w = 0, we nd that,
D  D0 = B
Xn+1
i=1
h
i

1  F (~i)
i
 B (1  F (0)) = B
Xn
i=1
h
i

F (0)  F (~i)
i
> 0.
Hence, M > 0M = (1   T )(w   c)D0. Next, we compare 0R and R [which is given as in (5)].
Noting that for i  n and any value of  2 [0; ], ~pr in (5) is greater than p0r , we nd that when
 2 [^i; i], A > p0r because ~pr < A for  2 [^i; i]; and when  2 [i; ], p^r > p0r because ~pr < p^r for
 2 [i; ]. Therefore, we have
R > B(1  T )
Xn+1
i=1
(
i
"Z 
~i
(p0r   w)f()d
#)
> B(1  T )
Xn+1
i=1
(
i
"Z 
0
(p0r   w)f()d
#)
= 0R.
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D.1.2 Impact of the income tax rates i and consumersincome tax rate distribution
on D, M , and R.
It is obvious that D and M are increasing in i. We also nd that
@R
@i
= B(1  T )i
(Z ^i
~i
t
[1 + (1  i)t]2
f()d +
tA
1 + t
 
1  F (i)
)
> 0.
Thus, D  D0, R  0R, and M  0M are increasing in i.
Note that i is the probability that a consumers income corresponds to the federal income
tax rate i, and the above proof has essentially shown that D(i) = B

1  F (~i)

, R(i) =
B(1 T )

1  F (~i)

((i)  w), and M (i) = (1 T )(w c)D(i) are increasing in i. Consider
two income tax rate distributions fig and f0ig such that their cumulative probabilities satisfyPm
i=1 i 
Pm
i=1 
0
i or 1  
Pm
i=1 i  1  
Pm
i=1 
0
i for m = 1; 2; : : : ; n (i.e., the income with the tax
rate distribution f0ig is greater in the usual stochastic order, and fig is more skewed to the left).
Compared with the distribution f0ig, fig has a larger probability for small value of income tax
rate i and a smaller probability for large value of i. Because D(i), R(i), and M (i) are
increasing in i, we can obtain that
Dji =
Xn+1
i=1
(iD(i)) <
Xn+1
i=1
 
0iD(i)

= Dj0i ,
Rji =
Xn+1
i=1
(iR(i)) <
Xn+1
i=1
 
0iR(i)

= Rj0i ,
M ji =
Xn+1
i=1
(iM (i)) <
Xn+1
i=1
 
0iM (i)

= M j0i ,
where fig and f0ig can be treated as two di¤erent weights.Our above conclusion must follow
because for larger values of D(i), R(i), and M (i), the corresponding weight i is smaller but
the corresponding weight 0i is larger; and for su¢ ciently large values of D(i), R(i), and M (i),
i must be smaller than 0i. Therefore, the improvements (D  D0), (R   0R), and (M   0M )
are larger when the income is greater in the usual stochastic order.
D.2 Justication for Remark 3
We learn from the proof of Theorem 3 that   1 if the following inequality is satised.
 =
X
j2fH;Lg
h
Bj
Xn+1
i=1

ji j(i)
i

X
j2fH;Lg
h
Bj (1  Fj((1 + t)wj)) (j0   cj)
i
, (58)
where j(i) is given in (47), and 
j
0 =
nR j
(1+t)wj
[=(1 + t) + (1  j)wj ]fj()d
o.
(1  Fj((1 + t)wj)).
In our proof of Theorem 3, one of the conditions in (58) is derived by equating A to AH . From
(49), we can obtain that
L(i)jA= AH = (1  it)
"Z j
~ji

j
1 + (1  i)t + (1  j)wj

fj()d
#
  cj

1  Fj(~ji )

> (1  it)
"Z j
(1+t)wj

j
1 + (1  i)t + (1  j)wj

fj()d
#
  cj (1  Fj((1 + t)wj))
> (1  it)
"Z j
(1+t)wj

j
1 + t
+ (1  j)wj

fj()d
#
  cj (1  Fj((1 + t)wj))
= (1  Fj((1 + t)wj))
h
(1  it)j0   cj
i
,
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and thus jA= AH >
P
j2fH;Lg
n
Bj (1  Fj((1 + t)wj))
h
1  tPni=1(ji i)j0   cjio.
Comparing the above inequality with (58), we nd that, if t
Pn
i=1(
j
ii) is smaller, then jA= AH
is more likely to be greater than or equal to
P
j2fH;Lg
h
Bj (1  F ((1 + t)wj)) (j0   cj)
i
and a cost-
e¤ective automobile tax reduction policy is more likely to exist. Moreover, since consumers with
higher incomes are more likely to buy the high-end automobile, it generally holds that
Pn
i=1(
L
i 
i) <
Pn
i=1(
H
i  i). Given this fact, when BL is much greater than BH , a cost-e¤ective policy is
more likely to exist.
D.3 Justication for Remark 4
We rst consider if the policy can increase the retail price for each consumer. Note from the proof
of Remark 1 that p0r = =(1 + t) + (1 )w, which must be smaller than p^r. Then, we investigate
the impact of the Chinese automobile tax reduction policy on the sales and the manufacturers
and the retailers expected prots. From the proof of Remark 1, we nd that when there is no tax
reduction policy, the expected sales and the expected prots of the retailer and the manufacturer
are computed as
D0 = B (1  F (0)) , 0R = B(1 T )
0BBB@
Z 
0
f()d
1 + t
  w
1CCCA and 0M = B(1 T )(w c) (1  F (0)) ,
where 0 = (1 + t)w > [1 + (1   )t]w = ^. We then nd that 1   F (^) > 1   F (0) and thus,
D^ > D0, ^R > 0R [because
R 
^ f()d >
R 
0
f()d and 1 + (1  )t < 1 + t], and ^M > 0M .
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Appendix E Real Data-Based Numerical Experiments
Example 1 Suppose that the cuto¤ level for the U.S. policy is A = $49; 500 and the sales tax rate
in the market t = 5%. The retailers bargaining power is  = 0:4 (note that  2 [0; 1]). We assume
consumersvaluations  are normally distributed with the mean E() and standard deviation .
Chen et al. [8] also considered a normal distribution for the consumersvaluations, and found that
the standard deviations of consumersvaluations for three automobiles are between $2; 100 and
$6; 600; thus we assume  = $4; 000. As reported by Edmunds.com [13], the average retail price of
a car or truck in the U.S. in 2009 was $28; 492, we can reasonably assume that the average valuation
E() of consumers is the average retail price $28; 492 plus the sales tax 5% $28; 492 = $1; 424:6.
That is, E() = $29; 916:6. In addition, Albuquerque and Bronnenberg [1] calculated dealers
average gross margins as approximately $1; 600, based on individual car transaction data in the
San Diego area (a location where most of the included car brands and types are in the medium-
to high-end price segments). Accordingly, we assume that the retailer buys the automobile at the
wholesale price w = $27; 000 (and gains an average margin of $1; 492). Let the maximum valuation
 = $55; 000. Since  2 [0; ], we truncate the normal distribution function at zero and at , and
assume that the probability of negative values is added to that of zero and the probability of values
greater than  is added to that of .
We denote the U.S. income tax rate distribution by Pi (i = 1; : : : ; n+ 1), where n = 5 because,
as online Table A indicates, there are ve income brackets that correspond to ve di¤erent federal
tax rates for eligible consumers. Suppose i = Pi (i = 1; : : : ; n + 1), i.e., the income tax rate
distribution of consumers in the (generic) automobile market segment is the same as the U.S.
income tax rate distribution. We nd from (3) and (4) that, in order to calculate the expected
retail price , we have to estimate the U.S. income tax rate distribution Pi (i = 1; : : : ; n + 1).
Although we cannot get the data about the taxable income of each individual ler in the U.S., we
can nd from the tax statistics of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) [31] that the taxable incomes
of single and joint lers in 2009 have mean values of $25; 597 and $75; 257, respectively, and their
percentage distributions are given as in Panel B of online Table A. However, we still cannot obtain
Pi (i = 1; : : : ; 6), because the income brackets for the federal tax schedule (as given in Panel A of
online Table A) are di¤erent from the income ranges for the statistics of taxable income distribution
(as given in Panel B of Table A); moreover, they di¤er for the single and joint lers.
For the single lers, noting that each lers taxable income I is a random variable, we should
nd the estimated probability density function gS(I) that best ts the single lers percentage
distribution PercSi (i = 1; : : : ; 9) in Panel B of online Table A while assuring that the expected
value of I equals the mean taxable income of single lers. The best-tting distribution is a normal
distribution with the mean S = 25; 597 and standard deviation S = 28; 440:11. We then use the
corresponding cumulative distribution function GS(I) to calculate the income tax rate distribution
PSi (i = 1; : : : ; 4) for the eligible single lers as follows: P
S
1 = N(8350) = 27:21%, P
S
2 = N(33950) 
N(8350) = 34:34%, PS3 = N(82250)   N(33950) = 36:13%, and PS4 = N(135000)   N(82250) =
2:31%.
Similarly, for the joint lers, we nd that the best-tting distribution gJ(I) for their taxable in-
comes is a normal distribution with the mean J = 75; 257 and standard deviation J = 62; 219:34.
We then use the corresponding cumulative distribution function GJ(I) to calculate the income tax
rate distribution P Ji (i = 1; : : : ; 5) for the eligible joint lers as follows: P
J
1 = N(16700) = 17:33%,
P J2 = N(67900) N(16700) = 27:96%, P J3 = N(137050) N(67900) = 38:67%, P J4 = N(208850) 
N(137050) = 14:44%, and P J5 = N(260000) N(208850) = 1:44%.
From Panel B of online Table A, we learn that the proportion of single lers and that of
joint lers are 57:57% and 42:43%, respectively. Thus the U.S. income tax rate distribution Pi
(i = 1; : : : ; 6) is calculated as: for the eligible lers, P1 = 23:02%, P2 = 31:63%, P3 = 37:21%,
P4 = 7:46%, P5 = 0:61%, and the percentage of ineligible lers is P6 = 1 
P5
i=1 Pi = 0:07%. Using
(3), we calculate the expected retail price as  = $28; 518:17.
Similarly, if  = 0:6 and other parameters stay the same, then the expected retail price is
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 = $29; 277:26. 
Example 2 We use a numerical example to illustrate our analytical result to the extent that
the sales, and the manufacturers and the retailers prots in an automobile market segment are
increased after the policy is executed. We consider the same parameter values as in Example
1, and assume that the manufacturers unit production cost is c = $23; 000, the market size is
B = 10; 000. Moreover, we assume the corporate tax rate is T = 25%, because both China and the
U.S. used the corporate tax rate of 25% in 2008 and 2009 (see Global Finance [17]). We use (6)
to calculate the expected sales as D = 6; 752:45, and use (5) and (7) to compute the retailers and
the manufacturers expected prots as R = $7:6886 106 and M = $2:0257 107, respectively.
According to our analysis in the proof of Remark 1, we nd that, before the tax reduction policy
is implemented, the expected sales, and the retailers and the manufacturers expected prots are
6; 523:42, $7:1426106, and $1:9570107, respectively. After the policy is executed, the sales, the
retailers and the manufacturers prots are increased by 3:51%, 7:64%, and 3:51%, respectively.

Example 3 To illustrate our statement in Remark 3 which regards the cost e¤ectiveness of the
U.S. policy, we use the same parameter values of A, t, and T as those in Example 2, and consider
the following parameter values for both the Type-L and the Type-H automobiles: BL = 7; 000,
BH = 3; 000, wL = $24; 000, wH = $34; 000, cL = $20; 000, cH = $29; 000, and L = H = 0:4.
Moreover, the mean valuations of the Type-L and the Type-H automobiles are E(L) = 26; 000 and
E(H) = 37; 000;  = 4; 000 for both automobiles; L = $50; 000, and H = $60; 000. Note that
the manufacturers prot margin from the Type-L automobile is wL  cL = $4; 000, which is lower
than that from the Type-H automobile wH   cH = $5; 000. This is in line with the practical fact
that a manufacturer generally gains a higher prot margin from a high-end automobile than that
from a low-end automobile. For consumers in the Type-L automobile market segment, the income
tax rate distribution is L1 = P1+2% = 25:02%, 
L
2 = P2+1:55% = 33:18%, 
L
3 = P3 1% = 36:21%,
L4 = P4   2% = 5:46%, L5 = P5   0:5% = 0:11%, and L6 = 1  
P5
i=1 
L
i = 0:02%. Because the
income tax rate of all consumers in two market segments follows the distribution Pi (i = 1; : : : ; 6)
and the Type-L automobile consumers account for BL=(BL +BH) = 70% of the total market, we
can nd the income tax rate distribution of consumers in the Type-H automobile market segment
as H1 = 18:35%, 
H
2 = 28:02%, 
H
3 = 39:54%, 
H
4 = 12:13%, 
H
5 = 1:78%, and 
H
6 = 0:18%. Using
(14), we can nd the prot-cost ratio of the U.S. policy as  = 1:0506, which means that, as the
federal income tax is reduced by $1, the after-tax prot of the automobile supply chain would be
increased by $1:0506.
In the above base case, we change the sizes of both market segments to BL = 6; 000 and
BH = 4; 000, and the income tax rate distribution of Type-H automobile consumers is accordingly
changed to H1 = 10:5%, 
H
2 = 39:3%, 
H
3 = 31:4%, 
H
4 = 13:5%, and 
H
5 = 5:3%. The prot-cost
ratio of the U.S. policy is calculated as  = 1:0589. This implies that the market share for each
automobile type can a¤ect the cost e¤ectiveness of the U.S. tax reduction policy.
When we change the income tax rate distribution of the Type-L automobile consumers so that it
is more skewed to the right: L1 = 1:3P1 = 19:5%, L2 = 1:2P2 = 55:5%, L3 = 0:8P3 = 21:9%,
L4 = 0:3  P4 = 2:5%, and L5 = 1  
P4
i=1 
L
i = 0:6%. Given BL = 7; 000 and BH = 3; 000, the
income tax rate distribution of the Type-H automobile consumers is changed to H1 = 4:5%,
H2 = 24:6%, 
H
3 = 40:1%, 
H
4 = 22:2%, and 
H
5 = 8:6%. We nd that  = 1:0519.
We also change the standard deviation of consumersvaluations from the current value 4; 000
to 3; 500, we nd that the prot-cost ratio is  = 1:1361. Therefore, the degree of consensus
among consumers can be a key factor that a¤ects the cost e¤ectiveness of the U.S. policy. Later,
we will perform a sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of consumersvaluations on the
cost e¤ectiveness of the U.S. policy. 
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Example 4 We learn from the base case in Example 3 that the U.S. policy with the parameter
values given in the base case is cost e¤ective. We now determine a feasible target and a corre-
sponding budget for the government. To set the feasible additional system-wide prot generated
by the policy, we should solve the constrained nonlinear problem in (23) and nd the maximum
additional prot that can be achieved as S = 1:3132  106. Assuming that the policy intends
to increase the prot by ~S = 1:300  106, which is smaller than S, we solve the equation that
S = ~S and nd the cuto¤ level ~A = $35; 380. We then substitute ~A into the governments expense
function X Pj2fH;Lg(Bjxj) TS=(1 T ) and determine the budget ~X = 1:2446 106 that can
result in the targeted system-wide prot increase ~S = 1:300106 and the corresponding prot-cost
ratio  = 1:0445. 
Example 5 For the Chinese policy, we do not need to consider the consumers income level and
the income tax-related parameters as in Example 2. We assume that the original sales tax is
t = 10% and the tax reduction percentage is  = 50% or  = 25%. To compare the U.S. and the
Chinese policies, we use the same automobile with its parameter values in Example 2 to investigate
the e¤ectiveness of the Chinese policy.
Using (27), we calculate the expected retail price under the Chinese policy in 2009 (i.e.,
 = 50%) as $28; 459:89. Moreover, we use (28) and (29) to compute the retailers and the
manufacturers expected prots as ^R = $7:1426 106 and ^M = $1:9570 107, respectively. We
can also nd the expected sales as B(1   F (^)) = 6; 523:42. Moreover, we calculate the expected
retail price, the expected sales, and the retailers and the manufacturers expected prots before
the policy is executed as $28189:65, 5215:92, $4:6538106, and $1:5648107, respectively. It thus
follows that after the Chinese policy is implemented, the retail price, the sales, and the retailers
and the manufacturers prots increase by 0.96%, 25.07%, 53.48%, and 25.07%, respectively.
Since the Chinese tax reduction percentage  was 25% in 2010, we calculate the resulting ex-
pected retail price, expected sales, and retailers and manufacturers expected prots as $28316:48,
5881:93, $5:8076  106, and $1:7646  107, respectively. Comparing the above results with the
results before the policy is executed, we nd that the retail price, the sales, and the retailers and
the manufacturers prots would be increased by 0.45%, 12.77%, 24.79%, and 12.77%, respectively.
Moreover, when we compare the results for the cases of  = 50% and  = 25%, we nd that
as  is increased from 25% to 50%, the expected retail price, the sales, and the retailers and the
manufacturers prots would be increased by 0.51%, 10.91%, 22.99%, and 10.91%, respectively.
Note that the expected retail price ^ is increased as the value of  rises, even though the consumer
demand is price elastic because ^f(^)=(1  F (^)) = 4:80 > 1 at  = 25% and ^f(^)=(1  F (^)) =
4:01 > 1 at  = 50%.
Next, we provide a numerical example to demonstrate our result in Theorem 6 that ^ is
increasing in  when the consumer demand is price inelastic. Assuming that the mean and standard
deviation of consumer valuation  are $36,000 and $4,000, respectively, we nd that ^f(^)=(1  
F (^)) = 0:47 at  = 50% and ^f(^)=(1 F (^)) = 0:66 at  = 25%, which means that the demand
is price inelastic. We then nd that the expected retail price ^ = $30; 014:70 when  = 50% is
greater than ^ = $29; 730:64 when  = 25%, as indicated by Theorem 6. In another example, the
mean and the standard deviation of consumer valuation  are assumed to be $26; 000 and $500,
respectively. We nd that ^f(^)=(1  F (^)) = 277:65 at  = 50% and ^f(^)=(1  F (^)) = 360:33
at  = 25%, which implies that the demand is price elastic. The expected retail prices are then
calculated as ^ = $27; 037:55 when  = 50% and ^ = $27; 404:10 when  = 25%. The result reveals
that, when the demand is signicantly price elastic, the expected retail price will be decreasing in
. 
Example 6 For the Chinese policy, we do not consider the consumers income level and the income
tax-related parameters in Example 3. We assume that the original sales tax is t = 10%. We use
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the same two automobiles with the corresponding parameter values in Example 3 to investigate the
cost e¤ectiveness of the Chinese policy with  = 50% (used in 2009) or  = 25% (used in 2010).
We rst examine the policy with  = 50%. According to Theorem 7, we calculate 1L = 558:35,
2L =  218:76, 1H = 831:34, and 2H =  230:41. We nd that,  2L=1L = 0:39 (which is smaller than
L = 0:4) and  2H=1H = 0:28 (which is smaller than H = 0:4). Thus, the Chinese policy with
 = 50% should be cost e¤ective. In fact, we can use (31) to calculate the system-wide expected
prot increase as S^ = $6:6056106, and also nd the governments expense as X^ = $6:2672106.
Therefore, when  = 50%, the prot-cost ratio is ^ = S^=X^ = 1:0540. Similarly, when  = 25%,
1L = 263:70, 
2
L =  72:90, 1H = 384:42, and 2H =  40:00, which result in  2L=1L = 0:28 < L
and  2H=1H = 0:10 < H . Thus the Chinese policy with  = 25% is also cost e¤ective. Similar
to the above, we can nd that S^ = $3:2280 106, X^ = $2:6586 106, and ^ = S^=X^ = 1:2142.
If the retailers bargaining power for the Type-j automobile is j = 0:20 for j = H;L, then the
Chinese policy is not cost e¤ective when  is either 50% or 25%, because ^ = 0:8536 when  = 50%
and ^ = 0:9889 when  = 25%. However, when we set the tax reduction percentage  to be 20%
(i.e., the sales tax rate is reduced by 20%), we nd that 1L = 208:47, 
2
L =  52:60, 1H = 302:47,
and 2H =  20:32. Since
P
j2fH;LgBj(j
1
j + 
2
j ) = 44; 180 > 0, according to Theorem 7, the
Chinese policy with  = 20% is cost e¤ective with ^ = 1:0208. 
Example 7 Assuming that the tax reduction percentage  is unknown, we use other parameter
values in Example 6 to determine a proper reduction percentage ^ that results in the desired
feasible targets and the corresponding budget. Using Corollary 1, we nd the optimal tax reduction
percentage  (maximizing both the additional sales &C and the prot increase SC) as  = 0:603,
which means that, in order to assure the cost e¤ectiveness of the Chinese policy, China should
reduce its sales tax rate by at most 60:3% [that is, the lowest feasible sales tax rate should be (1 
60:3%)10% = 3:97%]. Using  = 0:603, we can calculate the corresponding maximum additional
sales of the Type-H and the Type-L automobiles as 599:58 and 1001:63, and the maximum system-
wide prot increase as $8:0270106. Assuming that China attempts to target the feasible additional
sales &^CH = 400 and &^
C
L = 800, we solve the equation that &^j = &^
C
j and nd that ^
1
H = 39:60%
and ^1L = 47:96%, thus ^1 = max(^
1
H ; ^
1
L) = 47:96% and the corresponding expense X
C
1 =
$5:9374 106. Similarly, we assume that the targeted prot increase is S^C = $6:0 106, and nd
that ^2 = 45:58% and the corresponding expense XC2 = $5:5605 106.
As discussed above, China should determine its budget as max(XC1 ; X
C
2 ) = $5:9374  106, in
order to achieve the targeted additional sales &^CH = 400 and &^
C
L = 800 as well as the targeted prot
increase S^C = $6:0  106. The corresponding tax reduction percentage is  = 47:96%, which
results in the prot-cost ratio ^ = 1:0654. 
Example 8 We examine the impact of the U.S. tax reduction policy when the manufacturer is a
strategic decision maker who may respond to the policy by changing the wholesale price.
We consider the same parameter values as in Example 2. Following the rst two steps in Section
6.2, we nd that the optimal wholesale price is w = $28300:24. We then use (6) to calculate the
expected sales as D = 5462:70, and use (5) and (7) to compute the retailers and the manufacturers
expected prots as R = $5:3021  106 and M = $2:1715  107, respectively. Thus the supply
chain prot is  = $2:7017 107.
We can also nd the optimal wholesale price before the policy is implemented by solving the
equation in the second step in Section 6.2 with all i = 0, which is w0 = $28143:75. Then, according
to our analysis in Appendix D.1, we nd that, before the policy is implemented, the expected sales
are 5364:19, and the expected prots of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the supply chain are
$5:1008 106, $2:0694 107, and $2:5795 107, respectively.
xxxiv
Tax Reduction Policies Online Appendices
After the policy is executed, if the manufacturer xes the wholesale price as w0, we can calculate
the sales as 5623:57, and the expected prots of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the supply
chain as $5:5624 106, $2:1695 107, and $2:7257 107.
Comparing the above results, we nd that a strategic manufacturer responds to the imple-
mentation of the U.S. policy by raising its wholesale price and gains a higher prot. As a result,
although the U.S. policy can improve the sales and the prots of the retailer and the supply chain,
the policys impact is less than that when the manufacturer xes its wholesale price. 
Example 9 We examine the impact of the Chinese tax reduction policy when the manufacturer
is a strategic decision maker who may respond to the policy by changing the wholesale price.
We consider the same parameter values as in Example 5 with the sales tax t = 10% and the tax
reduction percentage  = 50%. Following the rst two steps in Section 6.2, we nd that the optimal
wholesale price is w = $28143:75. We then calculate the expected sales as D = 5364:19 and the
retailers and the manufacturers expected prots as R = $5:1008 106 and M = $2:0694 107,
respectively. Thus the supply chain prot is  = $2:5795 107.
We can also nd the optimal wholesale price before the policy is implemented by solving the
equation in the second step in Section 6.2 with  = 0, which is w0 = $27380:02. Then, according
to our analysis in Appendix D.3, we nd that, before the policy is implemented, the expected sales
are 4799:19, and the expected prots of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the supply chain are
$4:0829 106, $1:5765 107, and $1:9848 107, respectively.
After the policy is executed, if the manufacturer xes the wholesale price as w0, we can calculate
the sales as 6148:16, and the expected prots of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the supply
chain as $6:4202 106, $2:0197 107, and $2:6617 107.
Comparing the above results, we nd that a strategic manufacturer responds to the implemen-
tation of the Chinese policy by raising the wholesale price and gains a higher prot. As a result,
although the Chinese policy can improve the sales and the prots of the retailer and the supply
chain, the policys impact is less than that when the manufacturer xes the wholesale price. 
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Appendix F Calculation of the Best-Fitting Distributions for the
Taxable Incomes of U.S. Single and Joint Filers
To determine the joint federal income tax rate distribution Pi (i = 1; : : : ; 6) for the single and joint
lers in the U.S., we rst nd a probability distribution that best ts the percentage distribution of
the U.S. single (or joint) lerstaxable incomes in Panel B of online Table A. Specically, because
each single (or joint) lers taxable income I is a random variable, we can nd the estimated
probability density function gk(I) that best ts the percentage distribution Percki (k = S for
single lers and k = J for joint lers; i = 1; : : : ; 9) in Panel B of online Table A while assuring
that the expected value of I equals the mean taxable income of the lers (i.e., k). We do this
by solving a nonlinear programming problem where the decision variables are the parameters of a
tested density. We proceed as follows:
Step 1: We consider four commonly used distributions (gamma, lognormal, normal, Weibull). For
each distribution, we solve the following minimization problem:
min  =
X9
i=1
"
Percki  
Z bi
bi 1
gk(I)dI
#2
, s.t. E(I) =
Z 1
0
Igk(I)dI = k. (59)
Here, the decision variables are the parameters of the tting distribution; bi (i = 0; 1; : : : ; 9)
denotes the taxable income ranges, Percki (k = S; J , and i = 1; : : : ; 9) denotes the empirical
percentage from Panel B of online Table A, and
R bi
bi 1 gk(I)dI means the estimated percentage
of lers with taxable incomes in the range [bi 1; bi] (i = 1; : : : ; 9), where k = S for single
lers and k = J for joint lers.
Step 2: We then compare the minimum sum of squared deviations obtained in Step 1 for all
distributions and nd the best-tting distribution as the one with the smallest value of .
Using the above two-step approach, we consider gamma, lognormal, normal, and Weibull dis-
tributions. For each distribution, we calculate the best-tting parameter values and the minimum
sum of squared deviations for single lers as shown in Table M. We nd that the probability
distribution that best ts the percentage distribution PercSi (i = 1; : : : ; 9) provided by the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service is the normal distribution with the mean S = 25; 597 and the standard
deviation S = 28; 440:11, which is rewritten as Normal(S ,S) or Normal(25; 597,28; 440:11).
Table M: Single Filers: The best-tting parameter values and the minimum sum of squared devi-
ations for gamma, lognormal, normal, and Weibull distributions.
Distributions Best-Fitting Parameters
Minimum Sum of
Squared Deviation
Gamma(k1; k2)
Shape parameter: k1 = 25; 730:40
Scale parameter: k2 = 0:9948
0:01909
Lognormal(; )
Mean of the variable Is logarithm:  = 9:637
Standard deviation of the variable Is
logarithm:  = 1:013
0:04291
Normal(; )
Mean of the variable I:  = 25; 597
Standard deviation of the variable I:  = 28; 440:11
0:00242
Weibull(; )
Scale parameter:  = 6; 748:54
Shape parameter:  = 25; 599:19
0:82377
Similarly, for each of the gamma, lognormal, normal, and Weibull distributions, we calculate
the best-tting parameter values and the minimum sum of squared deviations for the joint lers
as shown in Table N. We nd that the probability distribution that best ts the percentage
distribution PercJi (i = 1; : : : ; 9) provided by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service is the normal
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distribution with the mean J = 75; 257 and the standard deviation J = 62; 219:34, which is
rewritten as Normal(J ,J) or Normal(75; 257,62; 219:34).
Table N: Joint Filers: The best-tting parameter values and the minimum sum of squared devia-
tions for gamma, lognormal, normal, and Weibull distributions.
Distributions Best-Fitting Parameters
Minimum Sum of
Squared Deviation
Gamma(k1; k2)
Shape parameter: k1 = 69; 270:24
Scale parameter: k2 = 1:086
0:04149
Lognormal(; )
Mean of the variable Is logarithm:  = 11:015
Standard deviation of the variable Is
logarithm:  = 0:654
0:07095
Normal(; )
Mean of the variable I:  = 75; 257
Standard deviation of the variable I:  = 62; 219:34
0:01268
Weibull(; )
Scale parameter:  = 4; 330:29
Shape parameter:  = 75; 267:03
0:82983
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Appendix G Discussions on  1j and 
2
j in Theorem 7
We nd from (34) that, in the rst term of 1j (i.e., (1   t)
R j
^j
(   ^j)fj()d=[1 + (1   )t]),R j
^j
(   ^j)fj()d is considered as a Type-j automobile consumers expected extra (sales tax-
inclusive) valuation over the minimum valuation ^j for the purchased Type-j automobile when the
tax reduction policy is implemented. Since (1   )t is the sales tax under the Chinese policy, we
can regard
R j
^j
(   ^j)fj()d=[1 + (1  )t] as the consumers extra before-tax valuation over ^j .
Therefore, the rst term of 1j in (34) can be explained as the consumers extra before-tax valuation
excluding the tax reduction resulting from the Chinese policy. Similarly, in (34), the second term
[i.e.,
R j
j0
( j0)fj()d=(1+ t)] means the consumers extra before-tax valuation when the Chinese
policy is not implemented. It thus follows that 1j can be regarded as the expected increase in
the extra before-tax valuation of a Type-j automobile consumer that is generated by the Chinese
policy.
According to (35), we nd that the rst term of 2j can be rewritten as [(wj   cj)  twj ](1 
Fj(^j)), where (wj   cj) and twj represent the manufacturers unit prot from the Type-j au-
tomobile and a consumers tax reduction based on the wholesale price. We can thus regard the
rst term as the manufacturers expected prot from a Type-j automobile when a consumers tax
reduction on the wholesale price wj is not included. The second term (i.e., (wj   cj)(1  Fj(j0)))
refers to the manufacturers expected prot from a Type-j automobile when the policy is not im-
plemented. Hence, 2j given in (35) can be considered as the manufacturers tax reduction-exclusive
prot increase resulting from a Type-j automobile under the Chinese policy.
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Appendix H Proof of the Result for the Chinese Policy
We learn from the result and proof of Theorem 7 that the prot-cost ratio ^ is increasing inP
j2fH;Lg[Bj  (j1j + 2j )]. When consumers valuations for the Type-j automobile satisfy a
normal distribution with the mean j and standard deviation  ( fj() and Fj() denote the p.d.f.
and c.d.f.), we can show that
j
1
j + 
2
j = j
2

1  t
1 + (1  )tfj(^j) 
1
1 + t
fj(
j
0)

+

j
1  t
1 + (1  )t

j   ^j

+ (1  t)wj   cj

1  Fj(^j)

 

wj   cj + j
1 + t

j   j0

1  Fj(j0)

.
It then follows that
@(j
1
j + 
2
j )
@
= j
"
1  t
1 + (1  )tfj(^j)

^j j

2
+ 1

  1
1 + t
fj(
j
0)
"
j0 j

2
+ 1
##
+
1


(1  t)wj   cj + j 1  t
1 + (1  )t

j   ^j

fj(^j)
2 
1 

^j j

2
  1


wj   cj + j
1 + t

j   j0

fj(
j
0)
2 "
1 

j0 j

2#
.
In the above, ^j = [1 + (1  )t]wj and j0 = (1 + t)wj ; thus, ^j < j0 and ^j is decreasing in .
Because j is approximately equal to the average after-tax retail price, it should be greater than
j0. For reasonable values of parameters such that ^j  j   ,
@
@
8<: 1  t1 + (1  )tfj(^j)
24 ^j   j

!2
+ 1
359=;
=
tfj(^j)
1 + (1  )t
(
wj
^j   j
2
(1  t)

^j j

2
  1

  t
1 + (1  )t

^j j

2
+ 1

< 0,
and
@
@

(1  t)wj   cj + j 1  t
1 + (1  )t

j   ^j

=  twj

1  j 1  t
1 + (1  )t

  t
2
[1 + (1  )t]2j

j   ^j

< 0.
It is easy to show that (fj())
2 f1  [( j)=]2g is increasing in  when  < j and   j .
We can nd that @(j1j + 
2
j )=@ < 0, which indicates that
P
j2fH;Lg[Bj  (j1j + 2j )] and thus
^ are decreasing in .
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Appendix I Analytical Details Regarding the ConsumersChoices
Between Two Automobiles
I.1 The U.S. Tax Reduction Policy
We consider the negotiated retail prices for the two automobiles when a consumer can choose
between the Type-H and the Type-L automobiles. For the negotiation results, we dene relevant
notation in Table O.
u0j  maxfu(pk; k; i); 0g and v0j  maxf(1  T )(pk   wk); 0g j; k = H;L; j 6= k
~ji  [1 + (1  i)t]wj
^ji  [A  (1  )wj ][1 + (1  i)t]= j = H for Type-H automobile
ji  [A  (1  )wj ](1 + t)=  itA and j = L for Type-L automobile
~hi  L + [1 + (1  i)t](wH   wL)
~li  H   [1 + (1  i)t](wH   wL)
^hi  [1 + (1  i)t] [A  (1  )wH ] =
^li  [1 + (1  i)t] [A  (1  )wL] =
Hi  [1 + (1  i)t] [A  (wL   wH)] =
Li  [1 + (1  i)t] [A  (wH   wL)] =
ki 

A  (1  ) wj + v0j =(1  T )	 (1 + t)=  itA+ u0j k = h and j = H for Type-H automobile
k = l and j = L for Type-L automobile
Table O: List of notations for the negotiated retail prices under the U.S. policy.
Theorem 8 Given the two automobileswholesale prices (wH ; wL) and the U.S. tax reduction
policy with the cuto¤ level A, the consumer with the valuation j for the Type-j automobile
(j = H;L) and a federal income tax rate i 2 [0; 1] negotiates with the retailer. The negotiated
Type-H automobile retail price pH and Type-L automobile retail price p

L are computed as follows.
1. If (H ; L) 2 
0  f(H ; L) : H < ~Hi ; L < ~Li g, then the consumer does not buy any
automobile.
2. If H  ~Hi , then the consumer may decide to buy a Type-H automobile. The price pH is
shown in Table P.
Case Conditions Negotiated Retail Price pH
1
(H ; L)  
H1  f(H ; L) : ~hi  H  ^hi ; ~Li  L  Li
j u0H = L   [1 + (1  i)t] ~pL; v0H = (1  T )(~pL   wL)g
pH = p

H1  
 
H   u0H

=[1 + (1  i)t]
+(1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T )
2
(H ; L)  
H2  f(H ; L) : ^hi  H  hi ; ~Li  L  ^Li
j u0H = L   [1 + (1  i)t] ~pL; v0H = (1  T )(~pL   wL)g
pH = p

H2  A
3
(H ; L)  
H3  f(H ; L) : hi  H  H ; ~Li  L  ^Li
j u0H = L   [1 + (1  i)t] ~pL; v0H = (1  T )(~pL   wL)g
pH = p

H3  (H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T )
4
(H ; L)  
H4  f(H ; L) : hi  H  H ; ^Li  L  Li
j u0H = L   [1 + (1  i)t]A; v0H = (1  T )(A  wL)g
pH = p

H4  (H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T )
5
(H ; L)  
H5  f(H ; L) : hi  H  H ; Li  L  L
j u0H = L   (1 + t)p^L + itA; v0H = (1  T )(p^L   wL)g
pH = p

H5  (H + itA  u0H)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wH + v0H=(1  T )
6 (H ; L)  
H6  f(H ; L) : ~Hi  H  ^Hi ; L < ~Li g
pH = p

H6  H=[1 + (1  i)t]
+(1  )wH
7 (H ; L)  
H7  f(H ; L) : ^Hi  H  Hi ; L < ~Li g pH = pH7  A
8 (H ; L)  
H8  f(H ; L) : Hi  H  H ; L < ~Li g
pH = p

H8  (H + itA)=(1 + t)
+(1  )wH
Table P: The negotiated retail price pH for the consumer who buys a Type-H automobile.
3. If L  ~Li , then the consumer may decide to buy a Type-L automobile. The price pL is
shown in Table Q.

Using Theorem 8, we can derive the expected sales for the Type-j automobile (j = H;L) as,
Dj = B
(Xn+1
i=1
i
"X8
k=1
 ZZ

jk
f(H ; L)dHdL
!#)
. (60)
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Case Conditions Negotiated Retail Price pL
1
(H ; L)  
L1  f(H ; L) : ~Hi  H  Hi ; ~li  L  ^li
j u0L = H   [1 + (1  i)t] ~pH ; v0L = (1  T )(~pH   wH)g
pL = p

L1  
 
L   u0L

=[1 + (1  i)t]
+(1  ) wL + v0L=(1  T )
2
(H ; L)  
L2  f(H ; L) : ~Hi  H  ^Hi ; ^li  L  li
j u0L = H   [1 + (1  i)t] ~pH ; v0L = (1  T )(~pH   wH)g
pL = p

L2  A
3
(H ; L)  
L3  f(H ; L) : ~Hi  H  ^Hi ; li  L  L
j u0L = H   [1 + (1  i)t] ~pH ; v0L = (1  T )(~pH   wH)g
pL = p

L3  (L + itA  u0L)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wL + v0L=(1  T )
4
(H ; L)  
L4  f(H ; L) : ^Hi  H  Hi ; li  L  L
j u0L = H   [1 + (1  i)t]A; v0L = (1  T )(A  wH)g
pL = p

L4  (L + itA  u0L)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wL + v0L=(1  T )
5
(H ; L)  
L5  f(H ; L) : Hi  H  H ; li  L  L
j u0L = H   (1 + t)p^H + itA; v0L = (1  T )(p^H   wH)g
pL = p

L5  (L + itA  u0L)=(1 + t)
+(1  ) wL + v0L=(1  T )
6 (H ; L)  
L6  f(H ; L) : H < ~Hi ; ~Li  L  ^Li g
pL = p

L6  L=[1 + (1  i)t]
+(1  )wL
7 (H ; L)  
L7  f(H ; L) : H < ~Hi ; ^Li  L  Li g pL = pL7  A
8 (H ; L)  
L8  f(H ; L) : H < ~Hi ; Li  L  Lg
pL = p

L8  (L + itA)=(1 + t)
+(1  )wL
Table Q: The negotiated retail price pL for the consumer who buys a Type-L automobile.
The total demand for the two automobiles is D  DH + DL. Then, we can compute the man-
ufacturers and the retailers expected prots. Specically, the manufacturers and the retailers
expected prots are obtained as,
M = (1  T )(w   c)D, (61)
and
R = B(1  T )
X
j=H;L
(Xn+1
i=1
i
"X8
k=1
 ZZ

jk
(pjk   wj)f(H ; L)dHdL
!#)
. (62)
It follows that the system-wide expected prot is
 = M + R,
and the system-wide prot increase is computed as
S =  0,
where 0 is obtained from  by letting i = 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n.
Similar to Section 3.2, we can compute the governments net expense as X  BPj2fH;Lg xj  
TS=(1  T ), where
xj  t
Xn+1
i=1
ii
"X8
k=1
 ZZ

jk
pjkf(H ; L)dHdL
!#
.
Then, the prot-cost ratio can be calculated as
  S=X = (1  T )S

B(1  T )
X
j2fH;Lg xj   TS

.
I.2 The Chinese Tax Reduction Policy
Similar to Section I.1, for the Chinese policy, we can derive the negotiated retail price p^j when the
consumer chooses to buy a Type-j automobile as follows. For the negotiation results, we dene
relevant notation in Table R.
Theorem 9 Given the two automobileswholesale prices (wH ; wL) and the Chinese tax reduction
policy with the reduction percentage , the consumer with the valuation j for the Type-j auto-
xli
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u^(p^k; k)  (1  ) fk   [1 + (1  )t]wkg k = H;L
u^0j  maxfu^(p^k; k); 0g and v^0j  maxf(1  T )(p^k   wk); 0g j; k = H;L; j 6= k
^j  [1 + (1  )t]wj j = H;L
^h  L + [1 + (1  )t](wH   wL)
^l  H   [1 + (1  )t] (wH   wL)
Table R: List of notations for the negotiated retail prices under the Chinese policy.
mobile (j = H;L) negotiates with the retailer. The negotiated Type-H automobile retail price p^H
and Type-L automobile retail price p^L are computed as follows.
1. If (H ; L) 2 
^0  f(H ; L) : H < ^H ; L < ^Lg, then the consumer does not buy any
automobile.
2. If H  ^H , then the consumer may decide to buy a Type-H automobile. The price p^H is
shown in Table S.
Case Conditions Negotiated Retail Price p^H
1 (H ; L)  
^H1  f(H ; L) : ^h  H  H ; ^L  L  Lg p^H = H1+(1 )t + (1  )wH
2 (H ; L)  
^H2  f(H ; L) : ^H  H  H ; L < ^Lg p^H = H1+(1 )t + (1  )wH
Table S: The negotiated retail price p^H for the consumer who buys a Type-H automobile.
3. If L  ^L, then the consumer may decide to buy a Type-L automobile. The price p^L is
shown in Table T.
Case Conditions Negotiated Retail Price p^L
1 (H ; L)  
^L1  f(H ; L) : ^H  H  H ; ^l  L  Lg p^L = L1+(1 )t + (1  )wL
2 (H ; L)  
^L2  f(H ; L) : H < ^H ; ^L  L  Lg p^L = L1+(1 )t + (1  )wL
Table T: The negotiated retail price p^L for the consumer who buys a Type-L automobile.

Using Theorem 9, we can derive the expected sales for the Type-j automobile (j = H;L) as,
D^j = B
"X2
k=1
 ZZ

^jk
f(H ; L)dHdL
!#
.
The total demand for the two automobiles is D^  D^H + D^L. Then, we can compute the man-
ufacturers and the retailers expected prots. Specically, the manufacturers and the retailers
expected prots are obtained as,
^M = (1  T )(w   c)D^,
and
^R = B(1  T )
X
j=H;L
"X2
k=1
 ZZ

^j
(p^jk   wj)f(H ; L)dHdL
!#
.
It follows that the system-wide expected prot is
^ = ^M + ^R,
and the system-wide prot increase is computed as
S^ = ^  ^0,
where ^0 is obtained from ^ by letting  = 0.
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Similar to Section 4.2, we can compute the governments net expense as X^ = B
P
j2fH;Lg x^j  
T S^=(1  T ), where
x^j  t
X2
k=1
 ZZ

^j
p^jkf(H ; L)dHdL
!
.
Then, the prot-cost ratio can be calculated as
^ = S^=X^ = (1  T )S^

B(1  T )
X
j2fH;Lg x^j   T S^

.
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I.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Similar to our sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2 for the base case of two separate automobile
market segments, we conduct a sensitivity analysis for the case of consumerschoices between the
two automobiles. To compare the e¤ectiveness of the U.S. and the Chinese tax reduction policies,
we examine the impact of the decision variables of two policies (i.e., A and ), the sales tax rate
t, the mean and standard deviation of consumersvaluations for each automobile (E(j) and j),
and the correlation between H and L (i.e., ). Instead of considering two market segments, we
now assume that the two automobiles are sold to a market with the size B = 10; 000. Most of
the parameter values are the same as those used in Section 5.2. We assume E(H) = $36; 000,
E(L) = $26; 000, H = L = 4; 000,  = 0:5, wH = $35; 000, and wL = $24; 000. To investigate
the impact of , we increase its value from 0 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1. Our sensitivity analysis
results are presented below in Tables UY.
Table U: ConsumersChoices Between Two Automobiles: In Panel A, we calculate the expected
sales of each type of automobile (DH and DL), the retailers and the manufacturers expected
prots (R and M ), the system-wide expected prot (), and the prot-cost ratio () for the
U.S. and the Chinese policies in the current U.S. setting. In Panel B, we provide the results for
the sensitivity analysis on the cuto¤ level A (for the U.S. policy only). Note that A > wH . In
Panel C, we provide the results for the sensitivity analysis on the tax reduction percentage  (for
the Chinese policy only).
Panel A
Policy
Sales of Type-H
Automobile
Sales of Type-L
Automobile
Retailers Prot
(107)
Manufacturers
Prot (107)
System-wide
Prot (107)
Prot-Cost
Ratio
U.S. 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
Chinese 2421.57 4622.59 0.77210 2.47648 3.24858 1.1376
Panel B
Impact of the U.S. Policy
A DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
37000 1904.50 4621.92 0.66151 2.24360 2.90511 0.7292
39500 2410.54 4621.92 0.76815 2.47132 3.23947 1.1059
42000 2421.70 4621.92 0.77229 2.47634 3.24863 1.1299
44500 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
47000 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
49500 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
52000 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
54500 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
57000 2421.72 4621.92 0.77230 2.47635 3.24865 1.1300
Panel C
Impact of the Chinese Policy
 D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
10% 2344.02 4584.50 0.74486 2.43016 3.17502 1.1657
18% 2415.80 4619.85 0.77006 2.47307 3.24313 1.1396
18.64% 2421.57 4622.59 0.77210 2.47648 3.24858 1.1376
25% 2478.98 4649.19 0.79258 2.51030 3.30288 1.1177
26% 2488.03 4653.25 0.79584 2.51559 3.31143 1.1146
34% 2560.63 4684.71 0.82220 2.55770 3.37990 1.0907
42% 2633.56 4714.18 0.84915 2.59936 3.44851 1.0678
50% 2706.74 4741.66 0.87669 2.64053 3.51722 1.0459
58% 2780.13 4767.13 0.90482 2.68120 3.58602 1.0250
66% 2853.60 4790.58 0.93355 2.72132 3.65486 1.0049
74% 2927.25 4812.02 0.96287 2.76087 3.72373 0.9857
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Table V: ConsumersChoices Between Two Automobiles: A sensitivity analysis on the sales tax
rate t. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the value (which is given
outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
t DH DL R (107) M (107)  (107) 
1% 3016.77 (1.150%) 4835.32 (0.177%) 0.9993 (1.430%) 2.8081 (0.645%) 3.8075 (0.850%) 0.9684
2% 2867.04 (2.449%) 4794.52 (0.447%) 0.9389 (2.952%) 2.7285 (1.384%) 3.6674 (1.781%) 1.0069
3% 2717.62 (3.912%) 4745.30 (0.814%) 0.8809 (4.574%) 2.6465 (2.222%) 3.5274 (2.800%) 1.0468
4% 2569.00 (5.554%) 4687.73 (1.282%) 0.8254 (6.301%) 2.5624 (3.166%) 3.3877 (3.913%) 1.0879
5% 2421.72 (7.392%) 4621.92 (1.857%) 0.7723 (8.138%) 2.4763 (4.221%) 3.2486 (5.126%) 1.1300
6% 2276.30 (9.445%) 4548.07 (2.543%) 0.7217 (10.092%) 2.3888 (5.393%) 3.1104 (6.447%) 1.1729
7% 2133.27 (11.731%) 4466.45 (3.346%) 0.6734 (12.170%) 2.2999 (6.688%) 2.9733 (7.882%) 1.2161
8% 1993.16 (14.274%) 4377.37 (4.270%) 0.6275 (14.377%) 2.2101 (8.111%) 2.8376 (9.437%) 1.2595
9% 1856.45 (17.098%) 4281.24 (5.320%) 0.5839 (16.721%) 2.1198 (9.667%) 2.7037 (11.118%) 1.3027
10% 1723.62 (20.229%) 4178.48 (6.504%) 0.5426 (19.209%) 2.0292 (11.363%) 2.5718 (12.931%) 1.3454
Impact of the Chinese Policy
t D^H D^L ^R (107) ^M (107) ^ (107) ^
1% 3016.77 (1.150%) 4835.35 (0.178%) 0.9993 (1.429%) 2.8081 (0.646%) 3.8075 (0.850%) 0.9695
2% 2867.04 (2.449%) 4794.64 (0.449%) 0.9388 (2.949%) 2.7286 (1.385%) 3.6674 (1.781%) 1.0093
3% 2717.59 (3.911%) 4745.56 (0.819%) 0.8808 (4.566%) 2.6466 (2.225%) 3.5274 (2.799%) 1.0507
4% 2568.93 (5.551%) 4688.17 (1.292%) 0.8252 (6.284%) 2.5625 (3.170%) 3.3877 (3.912%) 1.0936
5% 2421.57 (7.386%) 4622.59 (1.872%) 0.7721 (8.110%) 2.4765 (4.227%) 3.2486 (5.124%) 1.1376
6% 2276.02 (9.431%) 4549.01 (2.564%) 0.7214 (10.049%) 2.3889 (5.400%) 3.1103 (6.443%) 1.1826
7% 2132.81 (11.707%) 4467.67 (3.374%) 0.6730 (12.106%) 2.3001 (6.695%) 2.9731 (7.874%) 1.2283
8% 1992.44 (14.234%) 4378.90 (4.306%) 0.6270 (14.287%) 2.2103 (8.117%) 2.8373 (9.423%) 1.2744
9% 1855.42 (17.033%) 4283.05 (5.365%) 0.5833 (16.598%) 2.1199 (9.672%) 2.7031 (11.096%) 1.3206
10% 1722.20 (20.130%) 4180.55 (6.557%) 0.5418 (19.046%) 2.0292 (11.362%) 2.5710 (12.898%) 1.3666
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Table W: ConsumersChoices Between Two Automobiles: A sensitivity analysis on the means
E(H) and E(L) of the consumersnormally-distributed valuations H on the Type-H automobile
and L on the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in
the value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
Case E(H) E(L) DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
1 34,000 24,000 1652.89 (10.317%) 3318.89 (3.963%) 0.4246 (10.243%) 1.7395 (6.588%) 2.1640 (7.286%) 1.7184
2 34,500 24,500 1849.93 (9.521%) 3661.61 (3.392%) 0.5001 (9.681%) 1.9310 (5.948%) 2.4311 (6.696%) 1.5457
3 35,000 25,000 2046.17 (8.768%) 3996.76 (2.850%) 0.5834 (9.142%) 2.1198 (5.339%) 2.7033 (6.138%) 1.3911
4 35,500 25,500 2237.92 (8.057%) 4318.57 (2.338%) 0.6742 (8.628%) 2.3027 (4.763%) 2.9769 (5.614%) 1.2530
5 36,000 26,000 2421.72 (7.392%) 4621.92 (1.857%) 0.7723 (8.138%) 2.4763 (4.221%) 3.2486 (5.126%) 1.1300
6 36,500 26,500 2594.59 (6.777%) 4902.62 (1.410%) 0.8771 (7.674%) 2.6384 (3.716%) 3.5155 (4.677%) 1.0210
7 37,000 27,000 2753.99 (6.208%) 5157.57 (0.998%) 0.9882 (7.236%) 2.7866 (3.250%) 3.7748 (4.265%) 0.9249
8 37,500 27,500 2898.20 (5.688%) 5384.85 (0.623%) 1.1050 (6.824%) 2.9196 (2.823%) 4.0247 (3.892%) 0.8407
9 38,000 28,000 3026.17 (5.219%) 5583.69 (0.284%) 1.2268 (6.439%) 3.0369 (2.437%) 4.2637 (3.559%) 0.7676
10 38,500 28,500 3137.52 (4.798%) 5754.38 (0.001%) 1.3530 (6.079%) 3.1382 (2.091%) 4.4912 (3.262%) 0.7046
Impact of the Chinese Policy
Case E(H) E(L) D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
1 34,000 24,000 1652.42 (10.285%) 3319.24 (3.974%) 0.4244 (10.193%) 1.7394 (6.581%) 2.1637 (7.271%) 1.7349
2 34,500 24,500 1849.54 (9.498%) 3662.06 (3.405%) 0.4999 (9.637%) 1.9309 (5.946%) 2.4308 (6.685%) 1.5593
3 35,000 25,000 2045.86 (8.751%) 3997.30 (2.864%) 0.5832 (9.105%) 2.1198 (5.340%) 2.7030 (6.130%) 1.4023
4 35,500 25,500 2237.69 (8.046%) 4319.18 (2.352%) 0.6740 (8.595%) 2.3027 (4.766%) 2.9768 (5.610%) 1.2622
5 36,000 26,000 2421.57 (7.386%) 4622.59 (1.872%) 0.7721 (8.110%) 2.4765 (4.227%) 3.2486 (5.124%) 1.1376
6 36,500 26,500 2594.46 (6.771%) 4903.33 (1.425%) 0.8769 (7.650%) 2.6385 (3.723%) 3.5155 (4.676%) 1.0273
7 37,000 27,000 2753.93 (6.204%) 5158.29 (1.013%) 0.9881 (7.215%) 2.7868 (3.257%) 3.7748 (4.265%) 0.9301
8 37,500 27,500 2898.18 (5.686%) 5385.57 (0.636%) 1.1048 (6.806%) 2.9199 (2.831%) 4.0247 (3.892%) 0.8450
9 38,000 28,000 3026.16 (5.218%) 5584.37 (0.296%) 1.2266 (6.423%) 3.0371 (2.445%) 4.2637 (3.559%) 0.7710
10 38,500 28,500 3137.52 (4.798%) 5755.03 (0.005%) 1.3528 (6.066%) 3.1384 (2.099%) 4.4912 (3.262%) 0.7074
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Table X: ConsumersChoices Between Two Automobiles: A sensitivity analysis on the standard
deviation  of the consumersnormally-distributed valuations H on the Type-H automobile and
L on the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the
value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
 DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
2000 1614.22 (17.053%) 5924.43 (3.604%) 0.4523 (13.989%) 2.5037 (7.177%) 2.9560 (8.175%) 1.8903
2500 1919.50 (12.883%) 5411.25 (2.938%) 0.5285 (11.834%) 2.4872 (6.187%) 3.0157 (7.138%) 1.6105
3000 2136.84 (10.335%) 5061.92 (2.467%) 0.6081 (10.260%) 2.4802 (5.380%) 3.0883 (6.307%) 1.4020
3500 2298.00 (8.622%) 4810.63 (2.120%) 0.6897 (9.068%) 2.4773 (4.737%) 3.1669 (5.651%) 1.2473
4000 2421.72 (7.392%) 4621.92 (1.857%) 0.7723 (8.138%) 2.4763 (4.221%) 3.2486 (5.126%) 1.1300
4500 2519.46 (6.468%) 4475.32 (1.651%) 0.8558 (7.395%) 2.4764 (3.801%) 3.3322 (4.701%) 1.0390
5000 2598.52 (5.748%) 4358.29 (1.485%) 0.9399 (6.787%) 2.4769 (3.454%) 3.4167 (4.350%) 0.9668
5500 2663.73 (5.172%) 4262.80 (1.349%) 1.0243 (6.282%) 2.4775 (3.163%) 3.5018 (4.056%) 0.9085
6000 2718.40 (4.701%) 4183.45 (1.236%) 1.1090 (5.856%) 2.4783 (2.917%) 3.5874 (3.808%) 0.8605
Impact of the Chinese Policy
 D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
2000 1613.49 (17.000%) 5927.35 (3.655%) 0.4517 (13.916%) 2.5043 (7.200%) 2.9560 (8.175%) 1.9197
2500 1919.05 (12.856%) 5413.09 (2.973%) 0.5282 (11.779%) 2.4875 (6.202%) 3.0157 (7.138%) 1.6299
3000 2136.54 (10.320%) 5063.16 (2.492%) 0.6079 (10.217%) 2.4804 (5.390%) 3.0883 (6.307%) 1.4156
3500 2297.79 (8.612%) 4811.53 (2.139%) 0.6894 (9.034%) 2.4775 (4.745%) 3.1668 (5.649%) 1.2572
4000 2421.57 (7.386%) 4622.59 (1.872%) 0.7721 (8.110%) 2.4765 (4.227%) 3.2486 (5.124%) 1.1376
4500 2519.35 (6.463%) 4475.84 (1.663%) 0.8557 (7.371%) 2.4765 (3.805%) 3.3321 (4.698%) 1.0450
5000 2598.43 (5.745%) 4358.71 (1.495%) 0.9397 (6.767%) 2.4769 (3.458%) 3.4166 (4.347%) 0.9717
5500 2663.66 (5.169%) 4263.15 (1.357%) 1.0241 (6.264%) 2.4776 (3.166%) 3.5017 (4.053%) 0.9124
6000 2718.34 (4.698%) 4183.73 (1.242%) 1.1089 (5.840%) 2.4784 (2.919%) 3.5872 (3.805%) 0.8638
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Table Y: ConsumersChoices Between Two Automobiles: A sensitivity analysis on the correlation
coe¢ cient  of the consumersnormally-distributed valuations H on the Type-H automobile and
L on the Type-L automobile. Each number inside the brackets is the percentage change in the
value (which is given outside the brackets) after a tax reduction policy is implemented.
Impact of the U.S. Policy
 DH DL R(107) M (107) (107) 
-0.8 3885.91 (4.441%) 5372.09 (1.376%) 0.9910 (8.613%) 3.3603 (2.948%) 4.3513 (4.186%) 0.8658
-0.6 3643.06 (4.827%) 5181.46 (1.542%) 0.9627 (8.426%) 3.1938 (3.202%) 4.1565 (4.367%) 0.9166
-0.4 3434.24 (5.155%) 5033.59 (1.645%) 0.9336 (8.312%) 3.0555 (3.390%) 3.9891 (4.502%) 0.9549
-0.2 3235.55 (5.490%) 4909.04 (1.722%) 0.9030 (8.237%) 2.9287 (3.561%) 3.8317 (4.626%) 0.9901
0 3034.34 (5.875%) 4801.55 (1.783%) 0.8703 (8.188%) 2.8058 (3.731%) 3.6761 (4.755%) 1.0255
0.2 2817.91 (6.335%) 4710.64 (1.829%) 0.8344 (8.158%) 2.6812 (3.910%) 3.5156 (4.888%) 1.0633
0.4 2568.73 (6.961%) 4642.23 (1.855%) 0.7944 (8.143%) 2.5486 (4.109%) 3.3430 (5.040%) 1.1059
0.6 2248.92 (7.968%) 4618.08 (1.849%) 0.7482 (8.133%) 2.3974 (4.345%) 3.1456 (5.222%) 1.1569
0.8 1733.00 (10.280%) 4732.92 (1.785%) 0.6910 (8.087%) 2.1997 (4.643%) 2.8908 (5.446%) 1.2218
Impact of the Chinese Policy
 D^H D^L ^R(107) ^M (107) ^(107) ^
-0.8 3887.16 (4.475%) 5373.61 (1.405%) 0.9908 (8.590%) 3.3613 (2.979%) 4.3521 (4.205%) 0.8748
-0.6 3643.82 (4.849%) 5182.57 (1.563%) 0.9625 (8.402%) 3.1945 (3.224%) 4.1570 (4.378%) 0.9245
-0.4 3434.75 (5.171%) 5034.51 (1.663%) 0.9334 (8.287%) 3.0560 (3.407%) 3.9894 (4.509%) 0.9623
-0.2 3235.89 (5.501%) 4909.85 (1.739%) 0.9028 (8.212%) 2.9291 (3.575%) 3.8319 (4.631%) 0.9973
0 3034.34 (5.875%) 4802.29 (1.799%) 0.8699 (8.162%) 2.8061 (3.742%) 3.6761 (4.755%) 1.0327
0.2 2817.90 (6.334%) 4711.34 (1.844%) 0.8342 (8.131%) 2.6815 (3.919%) 3.5156 (4.888%) 1.0706
0.4 2568.65 (6.958%) 4642.90 (1.869%) 0.7942 (8.115%) 2.5488 (4.116%) 3.3430 (5.039%) 1.1133
0.6 2248.67 (7.956%) 4618.76 (1.864%) 0.7480 (8.104%) 2.3975 (4.349%) 3.1455 (5.218%) 1.1646
0.8 1732.48 (10.247%) 4733.71 (1.802%) 0.6908 (8.057%) 2.1997 (4.643%) 2.8906 (5.439%) 1.2296
xlviii
